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5 September 1984

SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

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EDITORIAL ADVISES AGAINST 'HASTY' U.S. RESPONSE ON NEW ZEALAND

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 18 Jul 84 p 6

[Editorial: "U.S. Needs To Tread Warily in New Zealand"]

[Text] IT IS perfectly understandable that the American Secretary of State should be alarmed at the intention of the incoming New Zealand Labour Government to prohibit the entry of nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships to the ports under its control. Nonetheless, an American reaction which appears to the average New Zealander to be too vehement or too insensitive, could be counter-productive and serve to compound any possible damage to the ANZUS alliance.

Nuclear power and nuclear weapons are integral to the US Navy's operations. The proposed ban would deny it facilities necessary to the carrying out of its proper functions as envisaged by the treaty.

But too hasty an American response could make a potentially bad situation even worse. Despite the New Zealand Labour Party's decision on nuclear ships and the only too evident neutralist tendency within its ranks, it has not abandoned its commitment to retain New Zealand's membership of ANZUS, and it is unlikely that the new Government would wish to cut itself off from its traditional allies.

Mr Hayden has made it clear to Mr Lange that the Australian Government shares Mr Shultz's opinion and is anxious that ANZUS should not be undermined. Australian Labor is much closer on this issue to the Reagan administration than it is to the New Zealand Labour Party. But New

Zealand's ANZUS partners have many means of persuasion at their disposal which could influence Mr Lange and his colleagues to induce their party to reconsider the stand it has taken.

However, Australia and the US would be mistaken if they were to expect immediate results. It is apparent that many members of the New Zealand Labour Party have strong reservations, ill-conceived as they may be, about the deployment of nuclear weapons.

The present policy is indeed a compromise, the acceptance of which prevented a much more blatantly neutralist resolution from being adopted.

Mr Lange could not immediately succeed in prevailing on his party to give up a prominent plank in the platform on which it has just been elected. If he did attempt to do so, he could place his leadership in jeopardy and risk a party split, and without achieving the end sought by Mr Shultz and Mr Hayden.

It should also be remembered that it is not only within the Labour Party that there is some trepidation about the alleged dangers of nuclear arms. The right-wing New Zealand Party, which won 12 per cent of the votes last Saturday, favors the abolition of the defence budget altogether.

However, even when the current difficulties are taken into account, the fact remains that New Zealand is one

of the world's few democracies and its long-term interests are inseparable from those of the Western alliance. It is probable that when New Zealanders fully realise the consequence of the new Government's policy, they will reconsider their decision.

If it seems to them that they are being bullied by their more powerful friends, the task of convincing them that they should change their present course could be made all the more difficult, and all hope of salvaging ANZUS could be lost.

CSO: 4200/959

ANZUS FOREIGN MINISTERS CALL FOR RESUMED USSR TALKS, TEST BAN TREATY

Melbourne THE AGE in English 18 Jul 84 p 6

[Article by David Elias in Wellington]

[Text]

The three ANZUS Foreign Ministers yesterday laid strong emphasis on arms control and nuclear disarmament and called on the Soviet Union to resume negotiations without delay.

In their seven-page communique at the end of the two-day ANZUS Ministerial Council meeting, the Ministers reaffirmed their "strong commitment" to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

They also reaffirmed the commitments of the Governments of the United States, Australia and New Zealand to work towards a comprehensive and fully verifiable nuclear test ban treaty.

They agreed that a convention to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, with adequate provisions for compliance and verification, would be an important disarmament measure.

The use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and the evidence of their use elsewhere reinforced the need for urgent conclusion of a convention to ban chemical weapons, they said.

The three countries were represented by their respective Foreign Affairs Ministers - Mr Hayden for Australia, Mr Shultz, the Secretary of State of the US, and Mr Warren Cooper, the Foreign Affairs Minister in New Zealand's outgoing Muldoon Government.

Because the new Government of Mr David Lange had not been sworn in it was not represented. The absence of a New Zealand Labor Government representative has not impaired the talks which some observers had described as meaningless.

The Ministers have taken a stance towards international affairs that was entirely predictable. The question of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific

was discussed at the council but without any firm moves made towards establishing it. According to the communique, Mr Hayden and Mr Cooper gave accounts of the progress made in discussions among members of the South Pacific Forum on the subject. It was noted that the proposed nuclear free zone would be discussed at the 1984 meeting of the forum in Tuvalu.

Later Mr Hayden said that there was a strong desire for the zone but there was still no firm idea of how to create it.

The communique said that both Australia and New Zealand council members had indicated that they shared fully the concerns of the South Pacific region on nuclear issues including French nuclear testing.

But beyond expressing concern, they made no further comment on the French tests at Mururoa Atoll.

Mr Hayden pointed out at a post-council Press conference that Australia had protested each time the French conducted a test.

The Ministers said they had reviewed a broad range of global issues and regional developments of concern to the Alliance.

These had included the persistent Soviet arms build up in the Pacific region and the need for early resumption of arms control negotiations.

• The leader of the anti-nuclear group People for Nuclear Disarmament yesterday attacked the Australian Government for its role in putting pressure on the New Zealand Labor Party to accept nuclear-powered and armed ships in its ports.

The convenor of the group, Dr Joe Camilleri, said that in response to the Federal Government's "unprincipled interference" in the sovereign affairs of New Zealand, it would make an issue of the nuclear ships and US bases in Australia in the coming Federal elections.

VETERANS GROUP, CHIEFS OF STAFF WARN ON WEAK DEFENSE

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 18 Jul 84 p 3

[Text] THE Victorian RSL [Returned Services League] has warned that Australia's army is so depleted it could not put 200 rifles into action in an emergency.

The president, Mr Bruce Ruxton, said at the annual branch conference in Melbourne yesterday: "The fighting strength of this nation has been decimated."

He backed a call to boost the armed forces by 10,000 by 1988, and 11 other defence resolutions.

The executive director of the Australian Defence Association, Mr Michael O'Connor, said the proportion of national resources spent on defence had fallen by almost 20 per cent in the past 17 years.

"The crisis has been a decade or more in the making and it will take as long to recover," Mr O'Connor said.

Mr Ruxton said *The Australian's* report that the chiefs of staff of the armed forces, in an unprecedented action, had warned the Government they could not guarantee the operational effectiveness of Australia's armed forces, was what RSL branches had feared for some time.

He said the Government's rundown of defence had to be exposed. Since the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, had come to power, the regular army had been reduced drastically, the Fleet Air Arm had been abol-

ished and training hours pruned ruthlessly.

"If Australia was attacked tomorrow up on the North-West Cape or across in Western Australia, I really fear what would happen," Mr Ruxton said.

He said RSL branches around Australia would be protesting to Mr Hawke about the rundown.

Irrational

"Australians must have the assurance of a well-organised, well-disciplined defence force. This is, without a doubt, the lowest ebb in our defence history and a tragedy for our security," he said.

Mr O'Connor said for too long Australia had relied on a combination of irrational dependence on allies' goodwill, inadequate appreciation of strategic realities and a Defence Department controlled by men with no belief in the value of a defence force to deter war.

Successive defence ministers had been reduced to mere spokesmen for the department by their failure to give positive direction to defence policy.

EDITORIAL HAILS PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION MEETING

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 18 Jul 84 p 6

[Editorial: "Keeping the Club Exclusive"]

[Text] The decision by Australia to attend and participate in the meeting in Luxembourg of Western nations which supply nuclear technology is a welcome demonstration of the Federal Government's commitment to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. The Luxembourg meeting determined that supplier nations had to do more to curb the spread of nuclear weapons technology.

A similar meeting was last held in 1977. The meeting in Luxembourg reflects the Reagan administration's growing concern with the problem of proliferation. The proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, primarily to Third World countries, is becoming one of the major issues confronting the world in its search for peace. The dangers of a nuclear holocaust involving conflict between the superpowers is a constant concern of all nations, and attempts to avoid such a conflict have rightly dominated much of the international debate for many years.

However, the emerging danger is of the spread of weapons technology. As the nuclear club becomes enlarged the stability of the nuclear balance will be weakened, and the danger of desperate or grossly irresponsible political regimes actually using a nuclear device, or threatening such use, will correspondingly increase.

The Luxembourg meeting was prompted in part by immediate concerns about Pakistan's apparently progressing efforts to acquire the capability of producing nuclear weapons, and the belief that Pakistan

and China are co-operating in such a venture. As well, reports that Belgium is considering supplying Libya with nuclear technology and training have also given rise to concern.

Nations involved in supplying nuclear technology should be prepared to forgo the economic advantages of selling this technology to certain nations. They should be highly selective about whom they supply weapons technology to, so that the enlargement of the nuclear club is made as difficult as possible.

However, there are many problems associated with enforcing non-proliferation. Some nuclear technology is usable both for peaceful purposes and for the manufacture of weapons, so that nations can to some extent mask their intention to produce nuclear weapons.

The inexorable process of technological advance may eventually mean that despite the best efforts of supplier nations the nuclear club will be enlarged. Concern over this danger has led Australia to propose a review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to toughening up its provisions.

Australia's potential role in the attempt to stop proliferation has been highlighted by the Foreign Minister, Mr Hayden, as one of the main justifications for Australia developing its uranium industry. All nations must now bend every effort towards delaying, and if possible avoiding, the spread of nuclear weapons technology for as long as possible.

LOCAL INDUSTRIALISTS, POLITICIANS DISMAYED OVER NZ DEVALUATION

CER Renegotiation Called For

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 19 Jul 84 p 10

[Article by Greg Sheridan]

[Text]

AUSTRALIAN industry leaders have reacted with dismay to the New Zealand Government's decision to devalue its currency by 20 per cent.

Manufacturing and primary industry leaders were joined by coalition politicians in calling on the Federal Government to initiate talks with the NZ Government on possibly renegotiating the closer economic relationship (CER) agreement between the two countries.

The Metal Trades Industry Association executive director, Mr Bert Evans, said the MTLA may ask the Federal Government to renegotiate CER following the devaluation.

National Party Deputy Leader, Mr Ralph Hunt, also called on the Federal Government to hold talks with the NZ Government over the future of CER, while Queensland's Industry Minister, Mr Mike Ahern, warned that Australia could expect a flood of NZ manufactured goods because of the devaluation.

Queensland Premier, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, said devaluation would hit Australia's primary producers.

The Australian Meat and Livestock Corp said the devaluation could cause a crisis for Australian sheep farmers on world mutton markets, with Australian producers likely to be shut out of some markets.

The Federal Minister for

Primary Industry, Mr John Kerin, said the Australian meat and horticultural industries were the ones most likely to be affected.

NZ also is likely to have an advantage over Australia on international lamb markets.

The Sheepmeat Council of Australia called for the Australian Government to hold talks with the NZ Government over the importing of NZ sheepmeat.

The Australian Wool Corp said the 15 per cent of the Australian wool clip, which competes directly on world markets with NZ wool, would be affected by the devaluation.

But it is in the manufacturing sector that Australia will feel the greatest effect of the NZ devaluation.

Mr Evans said the move gave the NZ manufacturing industry an "incredible edge" over Australian manufacturers.

He said a range of circumstances were combining to give NZ's manufacturers significant advantages over their Australian competitors.

NZ's labor costs were significantly lower than Australia's, NZ's add-on costs were about half of Australia's, and NZ was able to buy raw materials more cheaply than Australia.

The NZ Government also gave its industries generous export incentives and the CER agreement gave NZ various advantages, Mr Evans said.

Mr Evans believes the move

will have a significant impact on the metals and engineering sectors.

Mr Evans said he had not yet had a chance to speak to the Government about the devaluation, but he would expect to within the next week or two.

Mr Robert Paterson, president of the NSW Chamber of Manufacturers, said the NZ devaluation was likely to affect the plastics industry in Australia, as well as farm equipment, carpets, metal fabricating and clothing industries.

He said NZ's products would be more competitive on Australian markets and Australia's products would be less competitive in NZ. But one of the

greatest areas of impact would be in countries to which both Australia and NZ export.

"NZ's exports will do very well in the Pacific Islands and in the Pacific Basin export markets," Mr Paterson said.

He also forecast that Australian manufacturers could look at whether they should relocate their manufacturing operations in NZ.

The devaluation could mean "further shrinking of jobs in Australia".

Mr Paterson said if the Australian dollar did not react to the devaluation, his association may consider asking the Federal Government to look at the CER agreement again.

Editorial Calls for Adjustments

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 19 Jul 84 p 6

[Editorial: "The Mutual Benefits of a Revitalised NZ"]

[Text] A BIG devaluation of the New Zealand dollar was inevitable, despite the charade which preceded it. The newly elected Government had no choice other than a decisive devaluation, but it has given no indication that it understands the follow-through which is needed.

The new Government's actions are contradictory. On the one hand it has devalued the dollar, and removed the ludicrous controls on interest rates imposed by the former government to stem the financial crisis. But on the other hand it will freeze prices for three months, so swapping a financial corset for a regulatory straitjacket, and preventing the very gains to New Zealand's hard-pressed industry a devaluation is supposed to bring.

The New Zealand economy is already riddled with export incentives, import controls and the like, which was the main reason the Closer Economic Relations Agreement between Australia and New Zealand took so long to negotiate. Now that circumstances have forced the new Government to make a large devaluation, it has a golden opportunity to remove many of those controls and let the private sector get

on with the job of allocating resources between industries. Yet there is no sign that it intends to do so.

Undoubtedly Mr Lange has inherited an economic mess. By fixing interest rates, prices and wages, the former government behaved dictatorially toward the end of its term.

The new Government has been strong on rhetoric about the foibles of the former government, though its achievements in reducing New Zealand's crippling energy bill should not be overlooked. However, it had become tired and was beginning to mismanage the economy. It is now the responsibility of Mr Lange's Government to carry out the adjustments that must be made. The longer it puts them off, the tougher they will become.

New Zealand is heavily in debt, though thankfully its situation is nowhere near as serious as those of the South American debtor nations. Put bluntly, it is living beyond its means, and only a real cut in incomes can solve the problem.

But that does not mean Australia should not do all we can to help New Zealand for the mutual benefit of both

nations. The balance of trade is already tilted largely in our favor, and it would be churlish to criticise the improved access of more competitive New Zealand goods to our market. Rather than criticise the outgoing Government of New Zealand, Australian Government ministers and their New Zealand counterparts would do better to direct their attention to ways of liberalising the Closer Economic Relations Agreement.

Since New Zealand is our fourth-largest export market, Australian industry is just as disadvantaged by the plethora of incentives and tax concessions New Zealand offers as it will be by the devaluation.

Mr Lange's Government has bitten the bullet on devaluation and if it continues to be pragmatic by giving the private sector some more elbow room, the benefits to both Australia and New Zealand will be great.

CSO: 4200/959

GOVERNMENT CRACKS DOWN ON CORRUPT OFFICIALS

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 28 Jun 84 p 21

[Article by Min Thu]

[Text]

EMPTY seats are getting common in Burma's People's Council. Reason: the evil which lurks behind every position of public trust.

While some of these seats were vacated for perfectly normal reasons, other People's councillors were temporarily suspended because of charges ranging from corruption to rape, from extortion to murder.

A total of 962 seats with the People's Councils fell vacant as 450 resigned, 410 passed away, while 102 others were booted out. Among those who resigned, 130 did so voluntarily, while 232 did so because they were transferred. Eight became monks.

The cases of official malpractices leading to dismissal from office were revealed recently by a report from the State Council, the country's highest body. Under the powerful State Council are the 14 state and divisional People's Councils which again have 314 town councils under them.

There are thousands of ward and village level councils under the town councils. These People's councils are the local organs of state power with elected members. All candidates are nominated by the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the only political party allowed by the Burmese Constitution.

The report, covering Sept.16, 1983 to Feb.14, 1984, also said seven Congress seats fell vacant as six resigned and one passed away. The election of two congressmen was declared null and void as their parents were not pure Burmese nationals as required by law. For the same reason, the election of 12 other People's councillors at different levels was also declared null and void.

Eleven People's councillors were sacked for being away without permission from their constituencies for more than six months. There were 18 councillors expelled from the party, while 73 others were kicked out for their crimes.

A look at corruption and other official malpractices, Burmese-style:

■ A village People's council chairman was suspended for allegedly attempting to rape a girl in her bedroom. Another was accused of abetting the commission of rape.

■ A ward council secretary and his followers forced a drunken man out of a boxing gym and beat him to death. Another village councillor and a group fatally beat a young villager for cattle rustling. Both councillors were suspended.

■ Two councillors, from different places, were suspended as they were accused of murder.

■ Four councillors were suspended for selling a bomb for about US\$187.00. The bomb was unearthed during the village road construction but was not handed over to the police.

There was also a case involving a council chairman who allegedly smuggled and sold abroad about 9,100 pounds of cotton seed meant for distribution to local farmers.

The State Council also had to issue another instruction to prevent village councils from spending funds collected on behalf of the state. The State Council ordered all local councils to cease all forms of illegal means of collecting funds by various state organs at all levels.

It was observed that some of the town councils were demanding bribes ranging from US\$75 to US\$182 from each of the trucks loaded with black market goods that pass through. In return, the black marketeers are immune from arrests and seizures. Some of these town councils even organised "search parties" at town entrances. Instead of arresting the black market operators, these councils instead demand bribe money.

But not all are mal-practices and power abuses in Burma's village councils. Some members gave up their lives in the service of the country as exemplified by 20 councillors who were recently killed by rebels, according to the State Council.

CSO: 4200/955

EXPORTS, ECONOMIC SITUATION DISCUSSED

Bangkok NAEON in Thai 27 May 84 p 6

[Article: "Merchandise Worth 680 Million Baht Crosses Thai-Lao Border"]

[Text] Second Lt Vinit Suwatthi, a border customs officer at Nong Khai, explained the trade situation between Thailand and the Lao People's Democratic Republic during 7 months of the 1984 Fiscal Year, from October 1983 to April 1984. He said that the following merchandise was exported through Nong Khai border customs to Laos: nonglutinous and glutinous rice, white sugar, cement, sodium glutamate, condensed milk, batteries, construction materials, electrical supplies and clothing, with a total value of 145,870,611 baht. Forest product merchandise exported from Laos was valued at 4,013,791 baht.

Merchandise exported from other countries through Thailand to Laos included automobiles, medicine, medical equipment, electrical supplies, agricultural supplies, machinery, chemicals, bicycles, motorcycles and fuel oil, worth 490,478,480 baht. Merchandise exported from Laos through Thailand to other countries included lumber worth 43,281,225 baht. The total trade of the two sides was worth 683,644,107 baht.

Trade between Thailand and Laos will decrease as the days go by, for many reasons. Lao authorities are becoming increasingly strict about imports and exports, and payment must be in U.S. dollars or Thai baht only. In general, payments have been in barter, with the Lao goods appraised too high and not covering the investment. Along with that, there have been increasingly more imports into Laos each year, so it is not necessary to order the same goods for export to Laos. This has caused some retail merchants to give up their businesses. It is expected that trade will return to its normal condition again because the Lao population still must rely on imported consumer goods and construction materials for daily use.

12587
CSO: 4207/188

CHAMPASSAK OFFICIAL SEEKS BORDER BARTER WITH RTC

Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai 28 May 84 p 7

[Article: "Laos Solves Starvation Problem, Requests Thailand To Open Border"]

[Text] Laos has an extreme shortage of consumer goods and is seeking to open the border to buy goods from Thailand at the Chong Mek border point in Phibun Mangsahan District, Ubon Province.

Around mid-May this year, Mr Sipheng, the governor of Champassak Province in Laos, sent a letter requesting talks with Mr Kiatsak Tungkhamanee, the district officer of Phibun Mangsahan District in Ubon Province, to request Thailand to open the border at Chong Mek in order to purchase rice, medicine, salt and other necessary consumer supplies. After receiving the letter from Mr Sipheng, Mr Kiatsak Tungkhamanee, along with a committee consisting of an immigration officer, a customs officer, the commander of the 5th Company, 3d Division Border Patrol Police and district authorities travelled to meet with Mr Sipheng's committee in the Chong Mek border area.

The Lao and Thai committee officials had lunch together. Then Mr Sipheng opened the talks, requesting Thailand to open the border at Chong Mek, with Laos seeking to barter for necessary consumer goods and supplies, such as glutinous rice, medicine, salt and others, in exchange for wood, coffee and various forest products. [The Lao] were unable to pay in Thai baht or U.S. dollars.

Mr Sipheng revealed that Laos now is encountering many problems with vital household consumer products, because third country aid is minimal and inadequate for sharing among the entire population, so that the people are having a lot of difficulties. On the Thai side, Mr Kiatsak Tungkhamanee agreed to present this matter to provincial officials for further consideration.

12587
CSO: 4207/188

HIT SQUAD SAID TO TARGET LEADERS IN THAI REFUGEE CAMP

Bangkok NAEON in Thai 18 Jun 84 pp 1, 2

[Text] A Lao hit squad has dared to send a force with the aim of killing Lao leaders in the Nakhon Phanom refugee camp, but Thai police have smelled out the plot even more quickly so are strictly inspecting refugees and are prepared to defeat the hit squad.

A news source from Nakhon Phanom reported that a 1130 am (18 June) Pol Maj Yod Lamom, chief inspector of the Nakhon Phanom District Police, revealed to reporters that Mr Viroj Ammarath, the governor of Nakhon Phanom, had sent a letter, NKP 00151190, to him. [Mr Viroj] claimed [in the letter] that he had received orders from the Ministry of the Interior to keep an eye on Lao refugees, especially those who come from Paksan, and to inspect them with special care because the Ministry of the Interior has received reports from Nong Khai Province that a group of Lao has formed a "hit squad" with the objective of killing Lao leaders in a refugee camp.

The source reported that the hit squad is known as "Silver Unit," with Mr Khamphan, surname unknown, as the commander; the unit is located in Paksan District in Laos. The source stated that Mr Khamphan previously travelled down for meetings to Ban Pakkrading, which is across from Ban Nong Deun, Bungkhla Precinct, Bungkan District in Nong Khai Province. The group has chosen Mr Khamsai, surname unknown, who is the village chief of Pakkrading, to join them and there are six other people, Mr Thongphune, Mr Hatsady, Mr Onh and three other unknown persons. The hit squad has the objective of carrying out operations in the refugee camp at Ban Napho, Ban Phung Precinct in Nakhon Phanom District seat.

The source reported that to defend against terrorist acts that might occur, Maj Yod Lamom called a meeting of the involved police to lay out plans for suppressing this hit squad unit. At the meeting were Major Thaviphon Naisathien, duty inspector in charge assigned by Pol Maj Sanan Saengsuwan, station inspector. The police officers on duty must investigate the backgrounds thoroughly of both the Lao refugees who sneak into the county and those detained. The police at the Ban Wang Ta Mua checkpoint in Krut Precinct in the district seat are to check those coming over via any kind of transportation. The police authorities must take interest in patrolling along the Mekong River more strictly than previously. Along with that, the police have been seriously hunting the Silver Unit and it is expected that they will capture them in the not too distant future.

12587

CSO: 4207/188

GOVERNMENT TO ACT AGAINST PRO-KHOMEINI PROPAGANDA

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRaits TIMES in English 17 Jul 84 pp 1, 2

KOTA BARU, Mon — The pro-Ayatollah Khomeini sentiments expressed at a Haj seminar here yesterday amounted to a flagrant disregard for Government warnings about links with revolutionary Iran.

The Government is concerned and will take action to ensure that the people, especially prospective pilgrims, are not confused, Deputy Minister Besar Haji Ariffin Said said today.

He said the State Government "will act firmly."

Haji Ariffin added: "I must warn those responsible not to bring Iranian revolutionary influences into the State as they will be fiercely resisted by the people."

He would also discuss the matter with the Deputy Chief Police Officer, ACP Jaharuddin Adam.

Pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini and Iranian Cabinet Ministers were displayed at the seminar at the State Public Library Corporation which was attended by about 200 people said to be mostly Pas members.

Haji Ariffin said he was informed that several Pas State Assemblymen, former Assemblymen and party members attended the seminar.

A man, believed to be an Iraqi supporter of the Ayatollah Khomeini, was reported to be present at the one-day closed-door seminar.

The reason for the seminar and what went on there are still shrouded in mystery. No one seems to know who the organisers actually were, although the hall was booked by Pustaka Bakti, a bookshop located at the State Pas headquarters building.

Pas has denied implications that it was involved.

ACP Jaharuddin when contacted said police did not send any officer to the State Library Corporation where the seminar was held.

Police did not issue a permit for the seminar as it was a social function. No police report was lodged over the matter either.

He refused to confirm whether a report on the matter had been sent to the Bukit Aman.

Meanwhile, Kelantan Public Library Corporation chairman Datuk Haji Wan Hashim Wan Ahmad said he received information from a library official about 8.30am yesterday that posters of Ayatollah Khomeini were being put up at the seminar hall.

Datuk Haji Wan Hashim, who is a State Executive Councillor and State Religious Affairs Committee chairman, said he went to the library and told one Encik Mohamad from Pustaka Bakti to take down the posters as they had no connection with the Haj.

Pustaka Bakti had booked the hall through a

library official for holding a seminar on the Haj.

"It was approved, and a rental of \$300 was charged as the intention seemed genuine," Datuk Haji Wan Hashim said.

The application to use the hall was not referred to him as there was no other function scheduled to be held there yesterday.

Applications are only referred to Datuk Haji Wan Hashim if there are overlapping functions or when there is a need to review the rental rate.

In future, Datuk Haji Wan Hashim said, he would personally scrutinise applications to rent the hall "to prevent the growth of unhealthy activities."

Organisers of functions would be required to fill up forms, which among other things, will require them to name the organisation requiring the use of the hall, what the function would be about and the reason for it.

State Pas liaison secretary Haji Mohamad Amin Yaacob denied that the party organised the seminar.

"Pas members who attended the seminar were invited by the organisers. Among them were those who intend to perform the Haj or those who want to be more informed on the subject."

"Most of them thought the seminar was like one of those organised by Tabung Haj," Haji Mohamad Amin added.

WARNING ON DEMONSTRATIONS TO ASSURE FOREIGN INVESTORS

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 7 Jul 84 p 2

KUALA LUMPUR.
Fri. — The Deputy Prime Minister's warning in connection with demonstrations in the country was a reflection of the Government's concern over the impression given to foreign investors.

This is the view of the president of the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Dr Nawawi Mat Awin.

He said that that such demonstrations would give the impression of instability in the country which could adversely affect the economy.

"Of course this could well be the aim of irresponsible elements in inciting certain demonstrations," he added.

Dr Nawawi, who is also the president of the Malay Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said Datuk Musa's statement acknowledged that there were people who had genuine views and concern about certain issues.

Datuk Musa Hitam had yesterday warned organisers of demonstrations, particularly "political opportunists", that they would be held responsible for their deeds as the Government could not stand idly by if things got out of hand.

The Government, he added, would take firm action according to the laws of the country to avoid the "possibility of an epidemic of demonstrations."

Dr Nawawi said that

Datuk Musa, who is also the Home Affairs Minister, had also drawn attention to the danger that demonstrations, far from resolving problems, could be used by irresponsible elements to mislead the people for their own ends.

"By all means, let us exercise our rights and express our views and concern and have them publicly discussed but there are enough channels for the purpose without us having to resort to demonstrations.

"We certainly do not want to emulate certain countries where demonstrations are mounted for all kinds of issues."

Meanwhile, the Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) said the Government's warning amounted to "intimidation" and "force" would be counter-productive and undemocratic.

Its secretary-general, Mr Pan Yew Teng, said: "If the authorities care to act genuinely in the interests of the people, then the need for such protests would not have arisen in the first place."

Sensitivities

He felt that Datuk Musa's warning was aimed at the public protests over the proposed nuclear waste dump site in Papan, Perak, and the proposed levelling of the Bukit Cina Chinese cemetery in Malacca.

He added that during his daily visits to the Papan site, he found the picketing to be "peaceful.

democratic and civilised."

The Perak CPO, SAC Hasnan Abdul Aziz, has himself publicly testified that the protesting residents have been "patient" and that they were merely picketing and not demonstrating."

The SDP also strongly opposed the Malacca State Government's proposal to level the Bukit Cina cemetery.

Mr Pan said the SDP was not opposed to genuine and balanced development for the benefit of the people but felt that development must not disregard the wishes and sensibilities of the people.

"If land is really needed for housing and commercial development in Malacca, the most suitable site is the Ayer Keroh golf course," he said.

In Penang, Aliran president Dr Chandra Muzaffar said there is nothing wrong with demonstrations as long as they are peaceful and non-violent.

"Peaceful demonstrations are legitimate avenues of protest in any parliamentary democracy.

"They serve to highlight certain public grievances which have not been attended to by the authorities concerned in spite of all the attempts to draw a response from them through other democratic means," he said in a statement.

Dr Chandra was also commenting on Datuk Musa's warning.

"It was only a few months ago that the Government organised massive demonstrations all over the country to mobilise support for its position in the constitutional crisis," he said.

These Government demonstrations generated much more tension than the Papuan protest, yet no one talked of "the threat to peace and security" and the "danger of political opportunists exploiting the situation."

He said since demonstrations have a dramatic impact upon the public mind, they also help to develop social consciousness in a way in which letters to the Press and memoranda to Ministers cannot.

"As a result of the Papuan demonstration, our people have become more aware of the danger of going nuclear. The Government should be grateful for this."

DAP deputy secretary-general and Perak DAP director of political education, P. Patta, said that Datuk Musa's statement is clearly against the letter and spirit of the provisions in the Federal Constitution which stated all citizens have the right to assemble peacefully and without arms.

In Seremban, DAP's national president, Dr Chen Man Hin, said the people of Malaysia were educated enough to know how to express their feelings and dissatisfaction in a democratic and constitutional manner.

He said a peaceful demonstration was one way in which the people could express their rights.

He cited the Papuan demonstration as an example where the people had demonstrated peacefully.

Dr Chen added that the Bukit Cina issue was a way the people of Malacca wished to show their objection to the levelling of the hill.

He added the DAP will hold a peaceful demonstration at Bukit Cina at 11am on Sunday.

Importance

The Negri Sembilan State chairman of the People's Progressive Party, Mohamad Shariff bin Pachery Mohamed Theo, said his party welcomed Datuk Musa's statement.

In Kuala Lumpur, the MTUC held that demonstrations were constitutional and should be construed as legal efforts to demonstrate unity of opinion on matters of national importance.

Its secretary-general, Dr V. David, said a peaceful demonstration was an "act of disapproval of action taken by the authorities", allowing them the opportunity to take corrective measures.

"Article 10 of the Malaysian Constitution provides for peaceful assembly of people without arms and further clarifies it as a right," he said.

Dr David said the dumping of radioactive wastes in Papuan was an issue of public concern with the people having "rightfully exhibited their interest and concern for the issue."

He said the holding of public rallies in most towns by politicians during the recent constitutional crisis could be deemed as illegal attempts by political opportunists in the light of the Datuk Musa's statement.

"The Government must not practise double standards in its enforcement of policies and must be responsible for its deeds as much as the so-called political opportunists," he said.

Public organisations like trade unions and consumer associations will have to hold peaceful demonstrations and rallies to stress their views in a unified manner, he added.

TAIWAN TO DOUBLE OIL IMPORTS FROM MALAYSIA

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 6 Jul 84 p 28

[Text]

TAIWAN plans to double its purchase of crude petroleum from Malaysia which currently stands at 3,000 barrels a day.

Disclosing this yesterday, the advisor of the Far East Trading & Tourism Center Sdn Bhd, the local Taiwan trade office, Mr Charles L. Shyu, said his country imported \$161 million worth of petroleum in 1983 from Malaysia.

He said a delegation from the Chinese Petroleum Corporation in Taiwan would be visiting Malaysia to discuss petroleum exploration with the relevant authorities. He added that the delegation would also look into the possibility of going into joint venture in petro-chemical industries in Sabah.

Taiwan, he said, possessed the technology as well as the management and marketing expertise.

Mr Shyu also disclosed that the Nanlien International Trade Corporation had recently signed an agreement with the Malaysian Rural and National Development Ministry to help set up some 50 factories producing rattan, bamboo and ceramic products.

He said the recent visit by a Malaysian Industrial Development Authority delegation to Taiwan was fruitful.

The delegation had looked into the possibility of drawing Taiwanese participation in the petro-chemical, electronic, ceramic, car-parts and

timber industries.

He added that the managing director of Jasa Kita group of companies, Mr Robert Tan Hua Choon, was interested in a turnkey project for the manufacture of electric motors in Malaysia.

Mr Shyu said in view of this the Chinese External Trade Development Council, the Taiwanese trade promotion centre, would be organising a turnkey plant export exhibition at Wisma MCA, Kuala Lumpur, on Sept. 17 and 18 and another in Penang on Sept. 21.

A total of 26 Taiwanese firms representing a wide range of industries will participate at the exhibition.

He added that his country was impressed with Malaysia's interest in Taiwan's technical knowhow, especially in industrial technology, management knowhow and cottage industries.

Mr Shyu also disclosed that Taiwan was interested to set up joint ventures with Petronas and Hicom in the engineering fields.

He said trade between Malaysia and Taiwan was expanding rapidly. Malaysia, apart from Brunei, is the only country in ASEAN currently enjoying more than a two-to-one advantage in trade with Taiwan.

Last year, trade between the two totalled \$1.65 billion with Taiwan recording a deficit of \$619.42 million.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PRIME PROBLEM: RAZALEIGH

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 9 Jul 84 pp 1, 24

[Text]

FINANCE Minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah has called for a national campaign to get every Malaysian to play a part in helping reduce the country's balance of payments deficit, estimated this year to total \$3.8 billion.

The campaign, he said, should be something along the lines of "Be Malaysian and Buy Malaysian" and "Export to Survive."

He added, "Because of the considerable strain on the balance of payments and the continuing pressures that we envisage, the government is giving the highest priority to efforts that can help improve the balance of payments.

It is our Number One problem and our Number One priority in the field of economic management. It calls for concerted and coordinated action on all fronts."

Launching Supreme-QBE Insurance Bhd at a dinner in Subang Jaya on Saturday, he said the balance of payments problem was so encompassing that the country needed to address itself to not only financial and economic issues but socio-economic and political issues as well.

Tengku Razaleigh, warning that the spectre of another world recession loomed large, urged Malaysians to gear themselves to face any contingencies that might arise.

In outlining some steps that could be taken immediately, he stressed:

"We have to act now and we have to act deliberately and professionally. We cannot afford to wait for the world economic recovery to unfold nor wait till the next recession arrives.

"Despite all that we have done in the past, the balance of payments has not improved as much as it should have, and the continuing weakness must be arrested," he added.

One move being taken by the government, he said, was organising a national seminar on the balance of payments to pick the brains of representatives from all major sectors of the economy to devise an effective overall national strategy to improve the situation.

"We will have to review and re-examine many of our basic assumptions in economic and financial management," he added.

Another move the government was promoting was getting Malaysian importers to use, as far as possible, national shipping lines and insurance services provided by Malaysian companies. Incentives have been provided for in the 1983 and 1984 budgets.

Travel abroad would be another target of the national campaign, Tengku Razaleigh said, and this would be on two fronts, one being to get the people to use the national carrier MAS instead of the airlines of other countries when going overseas.

The other was the set-

ting up of more pre-university and professional colleges locally by both the government and the private sector, which would also cut down on foreign exchange payments on education abroad.

The Finance Minister noted that Malaysians spent \$2,106 million in travelling abroad last year while foreign visitors spent about \$1,230 million, thus landing Malaysia with a \$876 million deficit, compared with only \$185 million in 1978.

Another related move he mentioned was what government officials had always been speaking of — a comprehensive approach to promote the tourism industry in the country — and the Minister promised government assistance to the private sector in this field.

Tengku Razaleigh said another aspect the national campaign would concentrate on was payments of investment income by Malaysians to foreigners, which include repatriation of profits, interest on loans and dividend payment, all of which have been increasing by about 18 per cent a year since 1976 to reach \$4,886 million last year.

Where the government was concerned, he added, it was already acting in reducing this figure by cutting back expenditure.

The Finance Minister said the balance of payments problem was not that of the government alone but concerned all sectors of the economy and all sections of the population.

"For this reason, all of us from all walks of life have to be involved in making our contribu-

tions, however small, to the overall national objective of overcoming the problem," he added.

He pointed out that since the problem was also "structural" in nature and had been worsened by the prolonged recession, it could only be solved through a long-term approach.

On the current balance of payments, Tengku Razaleigh said the government's fiscal and monetary measures of recent years had put the brake on growth in imports.

It was now increasing at only about four or five per cent a year compared with 18.8 per cent in 1981.

Exports since last year were enjoying "vigorous growth in the double digits" and the merchandise account was expected to record a surplus of about \$3.7 billion.

But the deficit in the services account was expected to widen to \$9.5 billion, thus causing the deficit in the current account to reach about \$3.8 billion, but this would still be an improvement over the \$7.3 billion deficit of 1982.

The Finance Minister hoped the private sector would help improve the situation by drawing up and launching aggressive marketing strategies to promote not only the export of goods and products but also services, especially in insurance, shipping and tourism.

He was sure that the private sector would also be able to come up with other measures for the national campaign on the balance of payments problem and was confident that, with political will and business determination, the problem could be licked.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT TO NARROW

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 12 Jul 84 p 1

[Text] MALAYSIA'S balance of payments will strengthen considerably this year with the expected reduction of its deficit to \$5.5 billion, compared to \$6.7 billion in 1983, Deputy Bank Negara Governor Dr Lin See Yan, said yesterday.

In fact, with the inclusion of long term official and private capital inflows, the country's overall account of balance of payments has good prospects of generating a surplus for the first time since 1981.

The main reason for the optimism is that the country's exports are expanding faster than ori-

ginally forecast.

Dr Lin predicted a \$1.5 billion to \$4 billion surplus for the merchandise account this year, on expectations that exports would grow faster than the 16 per cent rate predicted earlier. Imports were expected to rise only moderately.

The country should achieve six per cent growth by the end of this year, about the same as 1983, said Dr Lin in a luncheon address to the Equipment Leasing Association of Malaysia.

Dr Lin said monetary policy in 1984 would be geared toward sustaining price stability and reducing the twin deficits in the public sector and the external payments account.

Malaysia's optimistic economic performance this year was mainly due to the recovery already under way in the indus-

trialised West.

"The pick-up in activity in the Malaysian economy that was evident since the second half of 1983 has spilled over into 1984," said Dr Lin. Economic activity, which was slow in the first half of this year, was expected to pick up in the third quarter.

Real gross domestic product should rise by 5 per cent this year, he predicted.

The pick-up in the economy and higher world prices would, however, fuel inflation slightly. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) will adjust upwards from last year's 3.7 per cent to about 4.5 to 5 per cent this year.

Dr Lin said the government's deficit was also expected to decline to \$7.4 billion this year (about 20.4 per cent of the GNP), compared with \$8.8 billion last year.

The continuing efforts to reduce government expenditure should soften the country's external debt position as well as relieve tightness in the domestic financial market — thus averting a situation of excessive demand which could fuel interest rate increases.

Money supply also contracted partly because the external sector attracted a large outflow of commercial bank capital. The tightness in money supply was also because the ringgit appreciated considerably against other currencies in the first half of this year.

The ringgit rose against its basket of currencies by 3 per cent, the US dollar by 0.5 per cent, the Singapore dollar by 1.3 per cent, sterling by 11.6 per cent, the Deutschemark by 4.9 per cent, the yen by 4.8 per cent and the Swiss franc by 10.3 per cent.

The public sector external debt service ratio, at 5.9 per cent in 1982, is expected to increase further to 7.6 per cent this year.

"But it would still be relatively low by international comparison," Dr Lin said.

CSO: 4200/954

THREAT FROM CLANDESTINE RADIO DISCOUNTED

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 12 Jul 84 p 5

[Text] KOTA BARU, Wed.--Broadcasts from the underground radio station, Suara Revolusi Rakyat Malaysia (Suram), do not threaten the country but its programmes are closely monitored.

Secretary-General of the Information Ministry, Datuk Wan Sidek Wan Abdul Rahman, who said this today added that the Government was more worried over the attraction of Thai radio stations.

He said that attractive programmes in the Kelantanese dialect had pinched listeners away from Radio Malaysia.

Datuk Wan Sidek was replying to points raised at a briefing for visiting Indonesian Minister for Information, Haji A. Harmoko, at the State Operations Room here.

A member of the Indonesian delegation had inquired about the existence of two clandestine radio stations broadcasting communist propaganda.

Datuk Wan Sidek said the Government had tried to jam broadcasts by Suram but it proved too expensive and not feasible.

"It is better to let the people themselves judge the station and assess its credibility," he said.

Datuk Wan Sidek said the Ministry had a division based in Klang to monitor Suram and make transcripts every day.

Transcripts of its programmes are sent to the Ministry and other Government Departments for perusal. The station, however, does not worry the Government much. He said the threat of communist indoctrination or of influence on the minds of the rakyat was not serious at present.

On Thai stations, he said a popular programme which attracted Kelantanese listeners was hosted by a "pak chu".

To overcome this, Radio Malaysia would increase local broadcasts and improve transmission to cover pockets where signals were weak.

The Indonesian delegation led by the Minister also included the Director-General of Television and Radio, Drs Subrata, Director-General of Press and Printing, Haji Sukarno, Information and Communications Officer Sukarto and District Information Director, Nordin Sham.

The delegation paid a courtesy call on Deputy Menteri Besar Haji Ariffin Said before attending the briefing given by State Development Officer Wan Razak Wan Rahman.

CSO: 4200/954

BRIEFS

PAS LEADERS DETAINED--KUALA LUMPUR, Tues.--A Pas Terengganu State Assemblyman and two other party members were detained under the Internal Security Act today. They are State Assemblyman for Jeram, Abu Bakar Chik, 30; Mohamad Sabu, 30, a businessman of Gua Petai, Penang; and Buniyamin Haji Yaakob, 38, of Bachok, Kelantan. All three are Pas Youth leaders. The Acting IGP Tan Sri Mohamad Amin Osman said in a statement that the activities of the three men were a threat to the security of the nation. He said they had incited certain people to use violence and other unlawful means to achieve their aims. He did not elaborate. Tan Sri Mohamad Amin added that they posed a threat to the harmony and unity of Muslims and thus the nation's security. The three were picked up before dawn by police in Kelantan, Terrengganu and Penang. Abu Bakar Chik, who is a Pas national Youth exco member, is also the Terengganu Pas Youth leader. This is his first term as a State Assemblyman. He won the Jeram seat in the 1982 elections. He was fined \$250 and sentenced to a day's jail by the Kemaman Kadi court on Sept. 7, 1982, after being found guilty of preaching at the Jamek Mosque, Cukai, on July 17, 1981, without permission from the Religious Affairs Department. Little is known about Buniyamin except that he is a member of the Pas national Youth exco. He is also the State Pas Youth leader and State Pas information chief. Mohamad, a petty trader, is the secretary of the Pas national Youth exco. Although he heads the Pas Youth in Penang, he was active in Kedah. Pas national information leader, Ustaz Nakhiale Ahmad said such arrests were becoming "a way of life" for Pas leaders. "In fact, we believe the arrests this morning are the start of a series of arrests by the authorities of Pas leaders." Nevertheless, he said, Pas will not be stopped. "It will give us greater strength to carry out our struggle," he said. [By Khairuddin Hassan and Fabian Dawson] [Text] [Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 11 Jul 84 p 1]

CSO: 4200/954

PHILIPPINES

COLUMNIST ON U.S. ENVOY VISITS, POSSIBLE USSR ENVOY VISIT

Davao City THE MINDANAO DAILY MIRROR in English 28 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Gil Abarico in the "Behind the Headlines" column: "Every Ambassador Has His Own Style But A Common Aim Motivates Them"]

[Text]

Local news caption: "MYSTERY SHIP TO UNLOAD CARGO?"—The mystery may become controversy.

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The coming here of US Ambassador Steven Bosworth is of some significance considering that is probably his first trip outside of metro-Manila to southern Philippines. Almost all US ambassadors to the Philippines always make it a point to visit Davao City during their tour of duty in this country. And most of them, including Ambassador Michael Armacost, got promoted when they were recalled to Washington. Of course, it could just be coincidence, but then a series of coincidences could be a lucky streak.

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Every Ambassador has his own style of projecting a favorable image of his nation. But most American envoys seem to be cut from the same mold, although the present US ambassador to the United Nations, Jean Kirkpatrick, seems to be breaking new ground. But then, no matter how diplomatic or how abrasive foreign representatives are, their fundamental concern is to protect the vital interests of their country. What makes US am-

bassadors different to the eyes of many Filipinos is that they represent good ol' Uncle Sam. But times are changing and so are the new generation of Filipinos.

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When Ambassador Armacost visited Durianburg, some newsmen had the opportunity of asking him some questions during an interview at the USIB office, then called USICA and manned by Chinese-American Carl Chan. While Armacost answered all our questions and the panel seemed satisfied (including "controversial" issues), the Ambassador actually said nothing of significance, that when we sat down to write our stories—we were hard put on how to do it from the most "newsway" angle. It was only at the latter part of his term that Armacost became quite an outspoken envoy, specially on Philippine-American relations in the wake of the Aquino assassination. Now Armacost is the number three man in the US State Department in Washington, D.C. This is partly why we are interested in listening to Uncle Sam's new man in Manila—Ambassador Bosworth.

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But what could certainly be

"news" in the diplomatic community here would be a visit by the Russian ambassador to this southern metropolis. Ever since the Philippines opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union during the early part of the New Society, no top Russian envoy has visited Davao except for cultural delegations and minor functionaries. But at the rate the two superpowers are competing in the world arena of political diplomacy—we wouldn't be surprised if that visit will due soon.

CSO: 4200/960

PHILIPPINES

COLUMNIST ON ADAZA, ROMUALDEZ EXAMPLES OF DOUBLE OFFICES

Quezon City ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA in English 27 Jul 84 p 4

[Commentary by Joaquin R. Roces in the "This is My Own" column: "Homobono and Kokoy"]

[Text]

We feel sorry for Homobono Adaza. He is an otherwise respected opposition man. But he wants to do exactly what the people have been criticizing some KBL Batasan members for. He wants to be both governor of his province and member of the Batasan, besides.

Other governors and mayors thus elected have willingly given away their positions, principally because there is a constitutional provision prohibiting any member of the Batasan from holding any other position not enumerated as an exemption by our fundamental law.

As Governor, he would have to be in his home province all the time as it is a full-time Executive position. As a member of the Batasan, he would have to be in the Metropolitan area practically one third of the year to attend to committee work, and the sessions.

In supporting his claim to both positions, he cites the many instances of members of

the interim Batasan, and even the present one, occupying other positions beside that of being an MP. Instead of citing these instances as worthy precedents, he should be denouncing them for what they are, a flagrant violation of the law.

The most glaring example of all, of course, would be that of Kokoy Romualdez. Kokoy is governor of Leyte. He ran for the Batasan and won. So he is also a member of the Batasan now. He is also the Philippine Ambassador to the United States. We will not argue the legality of this all. We will just point out the insanity.

As governor of Leyte, the seat of his office is in the provincial capital of his province. As member of the Batasan, the seat of his office would be in Quezon City hundreds of miles away. As Ambassador to the United States, the seat of his office would be in Washington, thousands of miles away. If we were to follow Adaza's argument that the people

knowingly voted for him as Assemblyman so he could both be Governor and Assemblyman at the same time, then the same would apply in the case of Kokoy as far as the first two positions are concerned. The question is: Did both Kokoy and Adaza explain to the people that there is such a constitutional prohibition and that the question may be raised at anytime?

As for Kokoy's being Ambassador besides, it would be like Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, American Ambassador to the Philippines in South East Asia, being Governor at the same time of his home state, and member of the US Congress, representing the same state.

The legitimate opposition seeks power so that it may do away with all unconstitutional practices of the majority that are to the people, or are against the known principles of good government. But if without even winning the majority they already adopt the insidious ways of the party in power, and will do just as the KBL is doing now, what would the people gain by throwing out one party and putting in another?

As a people, we continue to be obsessed with positions and titles. It is a good thing that Andres Bonifacio never occupied a position in the government. Otherwise, Camp Bonifacio would be called Camp President Bonifacio, or Camp General Bonifacio, when it was Bonifacio the plebeian, the Filipino, the man, who was the hero of his time.

But Aguinaldo he was a general. So when they named a camp after him, they had to call it not just Camp Aguinaldo, but Camp General Aguinaldo, no matter how awkward it sounds.

Homobono Adaza was a good governor. He would not have been elected a member of the Batasan if he were not. He will make an effective member of the legislature. He has the academic preparation. The political acumen. He is articulate and has the personality and the wit. And he has the charisma, besides.

But he is not above the Constitution. And instead of fighting for two positions, he should fight against what seem to be apparent violations of the law. He is a national official now.

CSO: 4200/960

PHILIPPINES

DAVAO PAPER REPORTS BUSINESSMEN'S 'DISMAY' OVER VIRATA REELECTION

Davao City THE MINDANAO DAILY MIRROR in English 31 Jul 84 pp 1, 6

[Article by Ram Maxey: "Businessmen Fear Virata's Reelection"]

[Text] The reelection of Cesar Virata as prime minister will set off a tidal wave of dismay from Aparri to Jolo in the country's business sector. This prediction was made yesterday by the Davao City branch of a large investment company with head office in Metro Manila.

"As a wizard in the rarefied atmosphere called 'high finance' Virata, as prime minister for more than a decade, had been expected to chart the course that would lead this country out of the economic doldrums it had found itself in," the MIRROR source said. "But after steadily sliding down from what had at first been a manageable situation to what it is today, our country can longer expect miracles to be woven by this man Virata!"

Declining to be identified for obvious reasons, the MIRROR source said that what this country needs is a prime minister who not only has the expertise the position demands, he must likewise be a man of guts who can call a spade a spade. In short, he added, the prime minister should also have the spine of a man who will not hesitate to say "No" to any governmental project the national leadership may embark on if he thinks that such a project would only end up as a futile exercise in government spending.

The MIRROR source then rattled off a list of what business circles in the country have labelled "the epitome of extravagance" in which the people's money went down the drain in useless efforts at image-building and follhardy attempts in creating false impressions of the country for the consumption of the outside world.

"Since 1972 there had been only one year during which the Philippines had a positive surplus--in 1975--and the rest of the time we have been trying to keep our collective heads above water to survive," the MIRROR source said. "If Prime Minister Virata in all that time failed to use his expertise and the power of his office to reverse the downward trend of our economy, how can we expect him to do that should he get reelected?"

The case of the banking community's problems vis-a-vis the government's posture of competing with private banks is another negative factor against the reelection of Virata, the source said. The prime minister, he said, could have used the prerogatives of his office to come to the rescue of the country's private banks instead of merely folding his arms and stand aside while the banking community is going to the dogs, especially in the face of unfair competition from the government's Central Bank.

As this was written the fate of Mr. Virata's bid for reelection was still up in the air, however, even as there was a move among some members of the Batasan to seek a delay in the election. The move was interpreted as a sign of displeasure within the Batasan, including KBL members, for Virata's alleged bungling of the economy caused in part by his being notoriously "indecisive" whenever the times called for "firmness and real statesmanship!" the MIRROR source said.

CSO: 4200/960

CEBU EDITORIAL HITS VIRATA ROLE IN CRISIS

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 29 Jul 84 p 3

[Editorial: "The Viratax Issue"]

[Text]

Mr. Cesar Virata's nomination for Prime Minister will be taken up today by the Batasan Pambansa. With the country's economy in shambles, the Opposition in the assembly will be expected not to make it easy for him to get elected. Or at least, it will be rough sailing for Mr. Virata. But by sheer numbers of the majority, he will surely get the nomination as Prime Minister.

Mr. Virata has been known to be an honest man who has not enriched himself in office. He is noted to be the American fair-haired boy as the economic architect of the country. He is the favorite of the IMF and WB.

But with what is happening to the country, the people doubt if Mr. Virata should still be entrusted with the same role he has played in the past. Mr. Virata should have been relegated to the dustbin of has-beens.

CSO: 4200/960

COLUMNIST ON CIVIL 'INTERVENTION' IN DAVAO MILITARY AFFAIRS

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 21 Jul 84 p 4

[Commentary by Casim Arkoncel in the "By-Line" column: "Major Daang Case-- Pure and Simple Meddling"]

[Text]

President Marcos had told a retinue of American legislators that the New People's Army is not a real threat to the country. In some way, the chief executive may be right because right now the armed forces of the Philippines is being held at bay by all sorts of restraints legal or otherwise.

Without going out of Davao, the military has lately found itself beleaguered by the civilian officialdom as well as some segments of the press. Viewing it from an unbiased angle, there appears to be an indication that there is some kind of a tie-up between the press and civil authorities over the choice of the provincial commander or PC-INP chief of Davao Oriental province. This came as no surprise to constabulary authorities as it is not the first time that Governor Francisco Rabat tried to pick his own choice to head the PC-INP in his province. More so that his wife, Edith, is now assemblywoman.

Woe unto the constituents of that province that even local officials kowtow to the wishes of the provincial executive. The boycott of the turnover ceremonies by the civilian officials was childish. Now that martial law

is expected to be reimposed, the supremacy of civil authorities will be meaningless if abused to a point of intervention in the running of military affairs.

The days of powerful politicians who could demand the appointment of a military official from the AFP brasses had ended way back in September 1972. The uncalled-for protest on the designation of Major Salvador Daang as provincial commander of Davao Oriental province is an outright meddling by civil officials on military matters. In times of disturbances as now, it appears that Gov. Rabat shows no trust in military officials not of his own choice. Perhaps, President Marcos can commission Rabat with the rank of colonel and sic him on all the NPAs not only in Davao Oriental but also all over Mindanao.

Major Daang had been assigned as assistant PC provincial commander in Davao del Sur and commanded the respect of the people of the province as well as the human rights lawyers who figured in legal skirmishes in that southern territory. Daang, they say is a professional soldier . . . a good one at that, otherwise Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos would not have

acted upon the recommendation of Brig. Gen. Jaime Echeverria, RUC II chief and Brig. Gen. Dionisio Tan-Gatue, Jr., RE-COM II commander. At least it would have been decent for the officialdom of Davao Oriental to have given Major Daang a chance to prove his worth before they ganged up on him.

On the onslaught some sectors of the press recently launched, there is ample indication that politicians had a hand in it. The military establishment had been on the defensive from the attacks by the press and civilian officials more than the NPAs had, prompting President Marcos to comment that the subversives are no real threat to his regime.

One of the reasons why the administration is reluctant to give back the police to local executives is the abusive stance poised by mayors and governors who have lost a lot since their cops came under PC rule or what is now known as the PC-INP integration.

Reports from Davao Oriental said that the entire province might turn opposition. Major Daang can only continue to exercise his functions regardless of whether his civil counterparts are KBL or opposition.

CSO: 4200/960

PHILIPPINES

MILITARY ASSURES SOUTH COTABATO MUSLIMS OF SUPPORT

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 27 Jul 84 pp 1, 3

[Text] Muslim leaders of South Cotabato were assured of full PC-INP support not only with regard to the military's efforts in maintaining peace and order in Muslim communities but also in solving their problems and enhancing the quality of the lives of the Muslim populace, during a dialogue in General Santos City early this week.

The PC-INP-Muslim leaders, pulong-pulong was spearheaded by Col. Andres M. Superable, provincial commander of the South Cotabato PC-INP Command with the cooperation of Atty. Dutya of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Davao City Chapter.

More than a hundred Muslims, acknowledged leaders in their communities all over South Cotabato, attended the dialogue. During the discussions, they presented prevailing problems affecting peace and order and people's welfare in their respective communities.

Their role as barangay leaders, particularly with regard to support the peace and order programs of the PC-INP, was also discussed by Col. Superable and Atty. Dutya. They were also informed of the various government agencies, besides the PC-INP, that could help them solve their problems, like health and sanitation and livelihood programs.

The Muslim leaders pledged their support of peace and order programs and of their participation in the celebration of the forthcoming PC-INP Day on August 8.

CSO: 4200/960

PHILIPPINES

200 REBELS RAID DAVAO DEL NORTE TOWN, SEIZE ARMS

Davao City THE MINDANAO DAILY MIRROR in English 31 Jul 84 pp 1, 6

[Text] Pantukan, Davao del Norte--About 200 heavily armed New People's Army guerillas clad in military uniforms raided the poblacion of this coastal town at around 2:00 o'clock Sunday afternoon killing a policeman after they ransacked the police station and its armory, the municipal building, the Pantukan District Hospital, Kadiwa Center and several other establishments.

The rebels were reportedly led by two commanders identified only as alias Kulot-Body and Tasio Montejos together with 5 amazons.

Executed by the rebels at the doorstep of their station was a certain Patm. Lipsen H. Sarael, 27. The victim died on the spot from multiple bullet wounds caused by bullets fired from an M16 armalite rifle.

According to Cpl. Cirilo Dawa, of the San Mariano INP who was in town during the raid the rebels arrived at the police station at around 2:00 o'clock P.M. and at gunpoint grabbed the radio transceiver from Patm. Zoilo Molles, Jr.

Upon order of their leader, Sarael was fetched from his residence some few meters away from the station while others ransacked the police armory. The victim was sprayed with bullets when he tried to resist when disarmed of his M16 armalite rifle.

Thirty one assorted firearms, an undetermined number of assorted ammunition and several typewriters were hauled by the rebels. They then broke into the municipal building and ransacked the mayor's and assessor's office.

Most of the firearms belong to a 14-man CNDF detachment who resigned from their posts earlier because they have not received their allowances.

Daval said another group destroyed the padlock of the Kadiwa Center and hauled several sacks full of prime commodities while others took the dental equipment inside the clinic of Dr. Lydia Quinones, municipal dentist.

Kagawad Occeno Diez also told the MIRROR that about 12 rebels entered the Pantukan District Hospital and at gunpoint stripped its drugstores of assorted medicines. Several boxes of medicines from the nearby Farmacia Lolita were also carted away by the rebels.

Also ransacked were the houses of Pfc. Iluminado Micabalo and Patm. Francisco dela Cerna where the rebels took a garand rifle and a radio cassette. Some uniforms were also taken by the raiders.

Diez said the rebels established two blocking forces in both entrances toward the poblacion probably to seal the entry of reinforcements coming from Tagum and Mabini towns and from Banaybanay, Davao Oriental. Hundreds of commuters were held hostage for about 30 minutes by the blocking force.

A Bachelor bus and a car reportedly owned by Davao Oriental Governor Francisco Rabat were sprayed with bullets when the driver refused to stop when flagged down by the rebels. Luckily nobody was hurt.

Before fleeing towards sitio Binaba, barangay Napnapan, also of Pantukan town on board 8 passenger jeepneys commanded along the highway the rebels blew the reservoir of the Pantukan Water District with the use of an M79 grenade launcher.

Another group withdrew towards barangay Tambongan on its way to Napnapan on board four logging trucks commanded from a certain logging firm operating in the boundary of Davao Oriental and Davao del Norte.

Col. Patrick G. Madayag, Davao del Norte PC/INP commander when informed of the raid two hours later sent a composite of PC/INP soldiers and army troopers. The reinforcement came late because the communication lines were cut off by the rebels when they ransacked the police station.

Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Jaime C. Echeverria, RUC XI commander who conducted an on the spot investigation of the incident directed Col. Teodoro R. Facelo, Task Group Panther commander to launch an offensive police-military operation in the high mountains of Pantukan where the rebels are possibly having their encampment.

Echeverria also exhorted municipal officials to be vigilant enough in reporting either to the police or to the military whenever they see a transient in town.

The general was briefed by Facelo that some of the rebels were already in the poblacion as early as Saturday evening, July 28 but nobody dared to report their presence because they (residents) thought that they were also soldiers clad in fatigue.

CSO: 4200/960

CPT VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REPORTED

Bangkok ATHIT KHLET LAP in Thai 9-15 Jun 84 pp 23-25

[Article: "CPT Special Delegation To Form Front With Green Party in Germany"]

[Text] Around last mid-May, Atsadang Kengsamat, a special news reporter of KHLET LAP who is stationed in West Germany, reported that a special CPT delegation went to West Germany to meet and exchange views with leaders of the Green Party, which is the political party of the young generation that is playing a prominent role among young people in Germany.

Atsadang reported that at this meeting there were exchanges of views on international matters between Green Party leaders and the special CPT delegation. The interesting points of the CPT's announced attitude toward international issues and the Indochinese countries can be summarized as follows:

The special delegation announced before the Fourth [CPT] Congress that it acknowledges disagreements with the Vietnamese Communist Party and the Lao Communist Party on certain issues:

1. The CPT tends to view the USSR as revisionist in that it wants to expand its power and control the world. The CPT sees the USSR as one of the two superpowers that are classified as the First World. It tends to agree with [sentence incomplete]
2. The CPT confirmed that the Vietnamese and Lao Communist parties had previously suggested that it use external armed forces to quickly liberate Thailand and that Vietnam and Laos were prepared to assist the effort. The CPT special delegation stated that, "We rejected this suggestion, because if we do it that way, the independent flag that we have raised for defending against foreign imperialism will be meaningless. Our people will not tolerate this."

The CPT special delegation related in detail that at the beginning of 1979, Vietnam and Laos broke relations with the CPT and demanded that it quickly move its quartermaster operations unit, war materiel warehouse, hospitals, nurseries, political and military schools, certain civilian working units, etc, away from border areas. The special delegation specifically mentioned

that the CPT unconditionally accepted that demand, but still considers the Vietnamese and Lao Communist parties to be fraternal parties that it feels deeply indebted to for its revolution. One of the delegates stated that, "We still maintain our hope that in the future we will still be able to be reconciled and have secure relations that will last."

Afterwards, the special delegation announced that the CPT had organized the Fourth Congress in the early part of 1982 and had reexamined its foreign policies. Interesting summaries of these issues follow:

1. The CPT saw that China's support for the Third World theory is not in agreement with its policies, is not productive for discerning international allies and enemies of the party and would isolate the CPT. Therefore, it denies the Third World theory in both "theory and practice." It believes that the Third World theory is just "Chinese foreign policy that does not concern the CPT."
2. The CPT realizes that its international enemy is imperialism, and that "the most important imperialist is the United States."
3. The CPT has reevaluated the USSR and stopped calling it a "revisionist," "a socialist imperialist" and "the cruelest world superpower." The CPT will no longer brand countries and parties that have close ties with the USSR as lackeys of "socialist imperialism" and "revisionists" as it previously did.
4. The CPT expressed its intention that, "It will be very perseverant in developing relations with the widest possible range of parties and allied countries by holding on to the following principle: that American imperialism is the common enemy and that all allies support the democratic revolution of the CPT and the Thai people. The CPT is opposed to the policies of the powerful controlling factions of Thailand that suppress and reduce democratic rights and cause trouble to the people. The CPT will cooperate without discriminating with all parties, sides, mass organizations and countries regardless if they are Marxist in doctrine, or with any socialist, socialist democratic, progressive, labor or other democratic party that is willing to welcome it and have it as an ally on grounds of equality and mutual respect for freedom and independence."

As for the CPT's future role regarding the Indochinese countries, the special delegation indicated to Green Party members and expressed the same opinion to German news reporters that at present [the situation is as follows]:

1. The Communist Party of the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea (DRK) headed by Pol Pot and Ieng Sary has officially dissolved itself so that at present, there are no relations between the party and the CPT and now in particular, none with the government of the DRK or even with the tripartite [alliance].
2. The CPT has never thought of breaking relations with the Vietnamese and Lao Communist parties and is willing to restore normal relations between parties. The special delegation declared that, "right now, the CPT is trying

to communicate with the Vietnamese party at certain levels for mutual understanding, 'only' the situation is still not progressing too smoothly."

The special CPT delegation stressed that the CPT is prepared to be an ally of the Vietnamese party and Vietnam "unconditionally" and that it is "prepared to negotiate at any level and at any place that both sides think is mutually appropriate." One of the special delegates stated to high level Green Party members concerning this matter that, "the CPT would be most appreciative for any international ally that is generously willing to mend relations between the two parties."

3. Concerning the Lao Communist Party, the special delegation stated that after the Lao party and government broke relations in mid-1983, the Lao party "started frequent contacts with the CPT at the local level, namely, provincial committees along the Thai-Lao border, 'but' that relations are still shaky, that they just call on each other occasionally." The CPT hopes that relations at the middle committee level will follow if some obstacles are eliminated and there is more mutual understanding than at present.

Nevertheless, the special delegation affirmed some former stands of the CPT toward the Indochina problem. "The CPT opposes the use of force by Vietnamese troops to seize and control Kampuchea. Its opinion is that all foreign troops should urgently withdraw from Kampuchea and let the people of Kampuchea freely decide their future themselves."

A German reporter asked the special delegation about Vietnam's accusation of the Thai Government and received the reply that, "if there are actual secret operations by the Thai Government to intrude into Kampuchea, the CPT calls upon it to put them to a stop. At the same time, the CPT also opposes Vietnamese troops intruding into Thai territory on the Kampuchean front." The special delegation stated that, "we would like to call upon every side to negotiate and solve the problem peacefully."

5. Finally, a German news reporter asked about the truth concerning the intervention of Vietnam and Laos through a "new communist party" that is being set up in Thailand and the opinion of the CPT regarding this problem. The special delegation stated that, "we have received news several times that there are newly set up Thai revolutionary parties named the Northeastern Thailand Liberation Party, the New Siam Party, the Green Star Party, etc. There are rumors that these parties have very close relations with the Vietnamese and Lao parties. If these newly set up parties really exist, the CPT is willing to be allied and cooperate with them unconditionally, if they have the sincere intention of fighting for democracy and improving the hard life of the Thai people, and if they take into consideration the interests of the nation, which must have true independence."

In examining reports concerning the activities of this special CPT delegation meeting with the Green Party--which is continuously becoming a prominent political party in Germany--we can summarize that present CPT activities have begun to stress eliminating all preexisting "divisive situations" between the CPT and other democratic blocs. Moreover, the published interview with

Phirut Chatrawanitchakoon, who is a CPT Central Committee member, also reflects that the CPT is trying to operate in a way to "expand its circle" by relating more and more to "fronts" on different levels, especially fronts that are not necessarily "Marxist-Leninist" or organizations that have "Marxist-Leninist" ideologies.

The CPT's perseverance reflects new, interesting developments, especially in relations with foreign countries, that are worth following.

These days, political parties, mass organizations and private business people in many countries, especially in Europe, are more actively assisting all kinds of laborers and others who do not receive justice from governments in Third World countries. CPT activities in Europe are a development that governments certainly cannot neglect.

12587
CSO: 4207/170

SECOND CAVALRY DIVISION ACTING COMMANDER PROFILED

Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA in Thai 17 Jun 84 p 42

[Text] Col Ariya Ukosakit, Second Cavalry Division Acting Commander

Age 48, born 9 Sep 1936 at Uthai District, Nakhon Sriayutthaya, the fourth of five children of Mr Suphak and Mrs Suchanit Ukosaki.

Graduated from Saint Gabriel's primary and secondary schools. Afterwards, he entered Army Cadet School, Class 12. He graduated from Chulachomkla Royal Military Academy, Class 5, in 1958, the same class as such important military officers as...

...Maj Gen Suchinda Khraprayoon, chief of the Army Operations Department; Maj Gen Viroj Saengsanit, commander in chief of the artillery; Maj Gen Vimon Vongvanit, commander of the 1st Special Forces; Maj Gen Kajorn Ramanwong, commander of the 2d Special Forces; and Maj Gen Issaraphong Noonphakdi, commander of the 6th Joint Division.

His first assignment was with the 11th Cavalry Battalion at Saraburi, as a platoon leader, company head and operations officer. From there, in 1965, he entered the Army Command and General Staff College, Class 44. He became operations officer of the 3d Division at Nakhon Ratchasima. From there, he returned to the Army Operations Department, at the time when Gen Chalad Hiransiri was the chief.

In 1968, he went to fight in Vietnam, was stationed at Be Ket Base, Bien Hoa Province, then returned and was deputy commander of the 1st Cavalry Battalion. Later, in 1972, he was transferred back to the Army Operations Department. In 1978, he was transferred and became the deputy commissary commander of the King's Guard. One year later, he was transferred and became the commander of the 3d Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, at Petchaboon.

In 1980, he was transferred back to become commander of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2d Cavalry Division. In 1982, he was appointed as the deputy commander of the 2d Cavalry Division and on 5 Jun 1984 he was appointed acting commander in chief of the 2d Cavalry Division to replace Maj Gen Vichat Laithomya.

In 1961, he married Uraiwan Navarat. They have three daughters, Chiraphorn, 21, who is presently attending the 3d year of Assumption Business Management College; Aranya, 19, studying the 2d year of accounting at Chulalongkorn University; and Arivorn, 14, attending the 2d year of Sathit Pathumwan School.

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CSO: 4207/170

SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER PROFILED

Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA in Thai 1 Jul 84 p 42

[Text] Maj Gen Vimon Vongvanit, First Special Forces Commander

Age 50, born 1 Mar 1934 in Suratthani Province. Third of five children of Mr Siri and Mrs Euane Vongvanit. Military officer, Chulachomkao Royal Military Academy, Class 5. One of the officers to watch of those to be promoted this October.

Attended public primary school of Chaiya District, Suratthani Province, and finished sixth grade at Buddhanikom School in Chaiya District, in 1950. Afterwards, he continued his education at Army Cadet School, Class 12.

Graduated from Chulachomkao Royal Military Academy in 1958, Class 5, same class as Maj Gen Suchinda Khraprayoon, chief of Army Operations Department, and Maj Gen Issaraphon Noonphakdi, commander in chief of the 6th Infantry Division.

He was initially appointed platoon commander of the 1st Battalion, 2d King's Guard. He was there for 3 years (1961), was transferred to be commander of the Pawai Parachute Battalion (Lopburi).

In 1965, he was transferred to be commander of security, Security Operations Center, and also attended the Army Command and General Staff College, Class 45, the same class as Maj Gen Issaraphong Noonphakdi. After graduation, he was transferred to be an officer in the Directorate of Joint Operations, 6th Joint Division (Ubon Ratchathani).

In 1966, he was chief of staff of the 6th Joint Division. In 1969, he was commander in chief of the Special Parachute Battalion based at Saritsena (Phitsanulok). In 1972, he was head of the Army Operations Division, Special Warfare Center (Lopburi). In 1974, he was commander of the 6th Army Region (Ubon Ratchathani).

In 1976, he went to the Army Staff College in England. In 1977, after he graduated, he returned as a professor to the Army Command and General Staff College. In 1979, he was commander of the 6th Joint Division. In 1981, he was the deputy commander of the 6th Infantry Division and was appointed commander in chief of the 1st Special Forces in October 1982.

He was a record-holding runner of Thailand, national rugby team player and former army champion marksman.

His wife is Major Mali, a former dentist at Sumphasithprasong Base Hospital (Ubon Ratchathani). They have one son and one daughter. The oldest is a boy named Kamonnan, 12, in the first year of Suan Kulap Secondary School, and Vimonnoot, [a girl] 8, who attends kindergarten in Lopburi.

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CSO: 4207/170

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VIETNAMESE GENERAL WRITES ON DIEN BIEN PHU CAMPAIGN

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 84 pp 1-20

[Article by Col Gen Le Trong Tan written for VOENNI MISL, a publication of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the historic Dien Bien Phu victory: "A Creative Development of Vietnamese military Art"]

[Text] Thirty years ago, during the historic first days of May, the people and the Vietnam People's Army won a resounding victory which inspired the entire nation and our friends all over the world: the 1953-1954 winter-spring campaign, the high point of which was the Dien Bien Phu victory.(1) That exemplary military victory struck a decisive blow against the aggressive will of the French imperialists, transformed the situation of the war, concluded gloriously the sacred resistance war of the Vietnamese people, liberated the north, and restored peace in Indochina.

The great Dien Bien Phu victory is recorded in the history of the Vietnamese people's glorious resistance to foreign aggression as a Bach Dang, a Chi Lang, or a Dong Da (2) of the 20th Century, and is recorded in world history as a brilliant feat of arms which breached the citadel of the colonial enslavement system of imperialism and began the collapse of old-style colonialism all over the world.

Militarily, the 1953-1954 winter-spring fighting and the Dien Bien Phu campaign signified a creative development of Vietnamese military art. They were models of the art of strategic guidance of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, led by our beloved President Ho Chi Minh, which successfully organized a strategic offensive on all battlefields and victoriously concluded the resistance war. They were also model successes of the campaign art and tactics of the VPA in an offensive campaign in the jungles-and-mountains theater which struck a major annihilating blow and smashed the strongest point of the highest defensive organization of the French Corps Expeditionnaire in Indochina at that time.

I

The 1953-1959 Winter-Spring Campaign -- Some Strategic Guidance Problems

During the fall and winter of 1953 the anti-French resistance war of the Vietnamese people began its eighth year. After the victory of the Border Campaign (September and October 1950), the VPA won one victory after another in

many offensive campaigns and a number of counter-offensive campaigns on an increasingly larger scale (3), grasped the strategic initiative more and more firmly, and strongly took the offensive initiative in the Bac Bo theater, the principal theater of the war in Indochina. The guerrilla war developed strongly and widely on the battlefields, behind enemy lines in the Bac Bo delta, Binh Tri Thien, southern Trung Bo, and Nam Bo, combined more and more closely with the campaigns of the main-force troops. In the course of many years of continuous combat and steeling, the armed forces of the Vietnamese people underwent outstanding growth. With regard to main-force troops, at that time the VPA had six infantry brigades, an artillery brigade, and many independent regiments with elite units. With regard to local troops, there were many battalions and regiments in the provinces. At the same time, powerful militia and guerrilla forces totalling millions of people developed extensively in all localities. They were very effective and were a source of continuous supplementation for the people's army. All three types of troops (main-force troops, local troops, and militia and guerrillas) took form and grew. That was a special advantage of Vietnam in comparison to France. At that time the total number of Vietnamese troops concentrated in units amounted to fewer than 300,000, compared to about 480,000 enemy troops, both French and lackey troops. In Bac Bo the number of main-force Vietnamese battalions amounted to only two-thirds of the enemy's.(4) But the enemy forces were dispersed widely, the balance of military forces tilted increasingly in the favor of Vietnam, and the Vietnamese people's armed forces maintained the strategic initiative on the main battlefields.

The anti-French resistance war of the Vietnamese people had an opportunity to advance to winning a decisive victory, and objective requirements at that time also demanded the resolution of that problem.

Because of Vietnam's repeated attacks, the French position in Vietnam became increasingly perilous and passive, although the U.S. imperialists gradually brazenly intervened in the fighting in Indochina and increased their aid to the French colonialists with regard to equipment, weapons, and war funding.

In the course of 7 years of carrying out a war of destruction, the French colonialists lost more than 300,000 officers and men. The strategic plans of d'Argenlieu, Pignon, Revers, and Tassigny (5) were bankrupted one after another. The French were gradually forced to change over from an offensive strategy to the defensive.

The more painfully they were defeated in Indochina, the more the reactionary French colonialists were subjected to the repeated attacks of the movement in France against the war of aggression. During the period of France's "dirty war" in Indochina, 17 French governments were formed and fell. Both the French colonialists and the U.S. imperialists realized clearly that in order to save the situation it was necessary to change generals, increase troops, and change plans. The Korean War had just ended and the United States was becoming increasingly involved in a plot to prolong and expand the Indochina war.(6) The Navarre plan was drafted against that background.(7)

The Navarre plan was a large-scale strategic plan, a political and military plot by both France and the United States against the revolutions of Vietnam and the Indochinese countries. The military goals of that plan were to annihilate most of the Vietnamese main-force troops, regain the initiative that had been lost, and win a strategic victory in order to change defeat into victory. That plan was divided into two phases:

1. During the fall and winter of 1953 and the spring of 1954, maintaining the strategic defensive in the north and carrying out a strategic offensive in the south, while at the same time expanding the puppet army and concentrating troops to create a large mobile force.
2. During the fall and winter of 1954, after the formation of mobile main-force units was completed, all forces were changed over to a strategic counteroffensive in the northern theater to win a decisive victory and force Vietnam to negotiate in a situation advantageous to France.

The French government urgently sent reinforcements to Indochina. The U.S. government provided 400 million dollars to organize puppet troops in Vietnam and decided to double military aid to France (in 1953, 650 million dollars, and in 1954 1,264 million dollars, 73 percent of the war expenditures in Indochina) and provide France with sufficient equipment to add six artillery battalions, two armored regiments, six transportation battalions, 123 airplanes, and 212 warships.

Between May 1953 and March 1954 France added 95,000 puppet troops organized into 107 battalions, thus increasing the number of puppet troops to the highest level ever. With regard to strategic mobile forces, France concentrated 84 battalions (including 12 battalions sent from France, North Africa, and Korea). By the spring of 1954 France's mobile main-force troops had increased to 100 infantry battalions and 10 airborne battalions. The total number of enemy troops increased to 480,000, 334,000 of whom were puppet troops.

In the fall of 1953 General Navarre began to carry out that strategic plan. The High Command of the French Corps Expeditionnaire concentrated a mobile force of 44 battalions in the Bac Bo lowlands and launched a fierce sweeping operation in the Red River Delta, while at the same time stepping up commando attacks, surprise attack, and bombing of the free areas in Vietnam. They dropped thousands of local bandits into Lao Cai, Lai Chau, and Son La in northwestern Bac Bo. In July 1953 they used paratroops to launch a surprise attack on the city of Lang Son. In August 1953 they withdrew all of their forces from Na San (northwestern Bac Bo) and concentrated them in the Bac Bo lowlands. In mid-October 1953 the enemy launched the Hai Au Campaign, they mobilized six mobile brigades, nine artillery battalions, and three armored battalions to attack the southwestern part of Ninh Binh, while at the same time carrying out diversionary activities along the coast in Thanh Hoa. The Bac Bo lowlands became France's primary troop concentration area. The objective of those enemy operations was to take the initiative by preempting Vietnam's plan to prepare for its fall-winter activities. They stepped up their psychological warfare and boastfully spread propaganda that they had "taken the initiative."

In November, when the French had concluded that they had in part attained those goals, they detected the movement of main-force Vietnamese troops toward the northwest. In order to defend Lai Chau and shield upper Laos, on 20 November General Navarre sent six airborne battalions to take Dien Bien Phu.

That was a new operation which had not been included in the plan drafted by Navarre. Then Navarre decided to transform Dien Bien Phu into a strongpoint and determined to "hold Dien Bien Phu at all costs" and force the main-force Vietnamese troops to accept a battle with strong French forces in that theater, in hopes of annihilating Vietnam's elite main-force units and inflicting heavy losses on Vietnam, after which France could regain the strategic initiative and cause its war of aggression to develop in its favor. That was an extremely important strategic decision. Navarre was subjective and did not suspect that dropping six battalions into the Muong Thanh basin at Dien Bien Phu, followed by a decision to challenge the VPA there, was the beginning of the most tragic chapter in the history of the aggression of the French Corps Expeditionnaire.

As for Vietnamese, on the southwestern Ninh Binh front the 320th Division and the local troops victoriously carried out a counteroffensive campaign to annihilate part of the enemy's manpower and smash the Hai Au campaign of the French army. The main-force units continued to take the initiative by carrying out their winter-spring operational plan to smash the Navarre plan of France and the United States.

Vietnam's strategic policy during the winter and spring of 1953-1954 was to use some of its main-force troops to attack places where the enemy were vulnerable, while at the same time stepping up guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines in all theaters and positively carrying out all necessary preparations among the people, local troops, militia, and guerrillas in the free areas so that the main-force troops could be free to fulfill their mission. The objective was to create an advantageous situation, select the correct course, concentrate the main-force Vietnamese troops to annihilate an important part of the enemy manpower, and bring about a basic transformation in the war situation in Indochina.

In order to fulfill that strategic policy there was drafted a strategic operational plan which initially included the following points:

1. Using part of the main-force troops to launch a medium-scale offensive campaign in northwestern Bac Bo, annihilate the enemy troops still stationed in Lai Chau, and completely liberate the Tay Bac Zone.
2. Coordinate with the Laotian Liberation Army by launching another offensive campaign in central Laos, annihilate enemy manpower, and expand the liberated area.
3. Setting aside an important part of the main-force troops in Bac Bo for secret deployment. Those forces were to remain hidden and prepared to act (a relatively large offensive or counteroffensive campaign could be organized), depending on developments in enemy activities and our intentions at that time.

4. Stepping up guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines in the Bac Bo lowlands in the form of activity cycles (sometimes with the nature of guerrilla campaigns) in order to coordinate with the campaigns of the main-force troops, consolidate and develop the guerrilla zones, and expand the liberated area behind enemy lines.

5. Preparing for the local armed forces and people in the Viet Bac, Zone III, Zone IV, and other liberated areas, so that they could be prepared to attack the enemy if they attacked the liberated areas.

6. Concentrating most of the main-force troops in central Vietnam, attacking the Central Highlands, wiping out enemy manpower, and liberating land, while setting aside a small number of main-force troops to, along with the local people, militia, and guerrillas, prepare to fight the enemy in order to defend the Interzone V liberated area.

7. Stepping up guerrilla warfare on the Nam Bo and southernwest Trung Bo battlefields, endeavoring to wipe out small elements of enemy troops, expanding the guerrilla zones, and being prepared to defend the free areas in Zone IX.

The above contents may be regarded as component parts of an offensive strategy in the anti-French resistance war in the final phase of the war which was intended to defeat the Navarre plan.

In that strategic offensive the Political Bureau of the VCP Central Committee adopted the slogan of actively taking the initiative and flexibility in movement. The Political Bureau set forth the following strategic and tactical guidance principles:

Wiping out enemy manpower and building up our forces.

Attacking to win certain victories and fighting annihilating battles.

Attacking the enemy where they were vulnerable and relatively weak.

In mid-November 1953 the Vietnamese main-force troops began to advance in the strategic direction that had been selected: the jungles-and-mountains theater to the west. On 10 December 1953 the 316th Division began an offensive campaign in the direction of Lai Chau. The 1953-1954 Winter-Spring Campaign began. In their first attack the VPA units, in the course of more than 10 days and nights of combat, wiped out more than 20 enemy companies, liberated Lai Chau, and threatened Dien Bien Phu from the north. The 308th Division moved urgently to reinforce the forces surrounding the enemy at Dien Bien Phu. Navarre was forced to send additional forces to Dien Bien Phu. By the end of December the enemy forces there had increased from 6 battalions to 10 battalions. More enemy troops were concentrated at Dien Bien Phu than any other place except the Bac Bo delta. Navarre's plan to concentrate troops began to unravel.

On 21 December the Vietnamese troops launched an offensive campaign in the direction of central Laos. In the second attack of the Winter-Spring Campaign two Vietnamese regiments, coordinating with the forces of the Laotian

Liberation Army, in the course of 5 days and nights of combat overwhelmed the enemy troops, wiped out four battalions, liberated the city of Thakhet, cut Route 9, and liberated nearly all of the vast central Laos region. The High Command of the French Corps Expeditionnaire had to send five battalions from the Bac Bo lowlands and the other battlefields to transform Seno (Savanakhet) into a new complex of strongpoints. Seno became the third point of enemy troop concentration.

On 30 December the Lower Laos offensive began. In that third offensive the Laotian and Vietnamese troops, including only one battalion of the VPA's 101st Regiment, annihilated an enemy battalion and liberated the Boloven Plateau and the city of Atopeu. The enemy had to send four battalions to reinforce the city of Pakse. Then the 101st Regiment of the 325th Division advanced far to the south, crossed over into Kampuchea, and cooperated with the Kampuchean Issarac Liberation Army to liberate Virachey and Siem Pang, threatened Stung Treng, and advanced down to the Salong River. The base areas in eastern and northeastern Kampuchea were connected with the liberated areas in lower and central Laos.

On 20 January 1954 the French mobilized 15 battalions to launch the Atlantic campaign south of Phu Yen in central Vietnam, an offensive campaign that had been included in the Navarre plan, which had the goal of taking the entire liberated area in central Vietnam. However, Vietnam continued to carry out its predetermined strategic operational plan.

On 26 January 1954 the VPA launched an offensive campaign against the enemy in the northern Central Highlands. The fourth offensive blow of the VPA was struck by the 108th and 803rd divisions, which liberated Kontum City, eliminated the enemy in the northern Central Highlands, advanced southward to Route 19, and expanded the liberated area by 16,000 square km and 200,000 people. Vietnam's northern Central Highlands campaign began the defeat of the enemy's Atlantic Campaign. Navarre was forced to call off that operation and send 14 battalions to hold the Central Highlands. The enemy forces dispersed over the southern Trung Bo battlefield increased to 30 battalions. Pleiku and a number of places in the southern Central Highlands became the fourth area in which enemy troops were concentrated.

On 26th January 1954 the 308th Division, which was surrounding Dien Bien Phu, was ordered to urgently attack the enemy along the Nam Hu River defense line and launch an offensive campaign in upper Laos. In the course of that fifth attack, Vietnamese and Laotian troops entered Muong Khoa, wiped out 17 enemy companies, including a European-African battalion, eliminated the enemy troops in the Nam Hu River basin, liberated Phong Saly, surrounded Muong Sai, and advanced close to Luang Prabang (the former capital of Laos). Navarre was forced to send two mobile groups and an infantry battalion from the Bac Bo delta and a colonial battalion from Xieng Khoang to set up strong point complexes at Muong Sai and Luang Prabang. Luang Prabang became the fifth area of enemy troop concentration.

While the main-force Vietnamese troops were ceaselessly attacking the enemy on the main front, the enemy's mobile main-force troops were dispersed in many

areas, on the battlefields behind enemy lines, especially in the Bac Bo lowlands, then in Binh Tri Thien and southernmost Trung Bo, guerrilla warfare developed very strongly. Many of the enemy's vital lines of communication were cut. Their military bases, airfields, supply depots, etc., were attacked. Thousands of enemy posts and guard towers were wiped out or forced to withdraw. The liberated area was expanded. The enemy had to spread their forces thin to cope with our attacks, which greatly limited their ability to reinforce the Dien Bien Phu battlefield or the other places.(8)

In mid-March the enemy thought that the period of VPA offensive activities had ended. On 12 March they concentrated part of their forces and resumed Phase II of the Atlantic Campaign, which had been interrupted, and landed troops at Quy Nhon in Trung Bo.

They did not suspect that the next day, 13 March 1954, elite main-force units of the VPA would suddenly launch the opening attack of the Dien Bien Phu campaign.

From the strategic intentions of Vietnam and France, and from the combat developments on the battlefield, it is possible to make the following observations about Vietnam's strategic guidance:

1. The 1953-1954 Winter-Spring Campaign was a strategic offensive waged all over the Indochina theater by Vietnam and the resistance war forces in Indochina to defeat the Navarre plan and win a decisive victory in the anti-French resistance war. That type of strategic operational activity (also called a strategic campaign), which appeared for the first time, signified a new development in the strategic military guidance of the Political Bureau of the VCP Central Committee and the VPA Command.

That was the application of the strategy of all-round people's war, the combination of conventional war with guerrilla war, and the combination of combat by mobile main-force units with combat by local armed forces and all the people in the final phase of the resistance war, and with diplomatic struggle to create the greatest combined strength with which to victoriously conclude the war.

2. That strategic offensive, although obeying the general laws of armed struggle in wars, had special contents of people's war strategy, liberation war, and national defense war in Vietnam.

It consisted essentially of offensive campaigns and a number of attacks on different scales carried out by the main-force units in selected areas in the jungles-and-mountains region, of which the Dien Bien Phu offensive campaign was the largest, in order to wipe out an important part of the enemy's main-force troops and liberate Vietnamese land. Those campaigns were closely combined with a number of campaigns by main-force troops in coordination with local armed forces and strong guerrilla warfare activities, especially behind enemy lines in the Bac Bo lowlands, Trung Bo, and Nam Bo, of which some activities bore the characteristics of a type of campaign which in the past was also called a "guerrilla campaign" in Vietnam, was intended to smash the French mobile main-force units, attack their lines of communication, headquarters,

military bases, airfields, supply depots, etc., wipe out an important part of the enemy manpower and expand the liberated area in Vietnam. At the same time, there were activities of a counteroffensive nature which combined offensive combat with defensive combat by main-force elements and local armed forces in order to defend the free areas in Vietnam, one of which became a counteroffensive campaign (by the 320th Division and the local armed forces in southwestern Ninh Binh, to defeat the French Hai Au campaign).

3. In order to organize and victoriously carry out that strategic offensive, Vietnam correctly evaluated the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy and clearly realized our strengths and weaknesses and those of the enemy on the Vietnam and Indochina battlefields, as well as the political situation in France and the world. On that basis, it made the correct observation that the resistance war had an opportunity to, and must, win a decisive victory, made a correct decision to win that decisive victory, and brought into play the greatest efforts on the part of the entire party, the entire army, and the entire population to attain, at all costs, the goal that had been set.

On the process of carrying out the strategic offensive, Vietnam closely monitored the development of the situation, dealt resolutely and flexibly with the strategic contingencies that arose, and always maintained and developed the strategic offensive. France wanted to concentrate troops, strengthen its strategic mobility, and prepare for a war-deciding battle with Vietnam on a battlefield of its choosing. However, they were forced to disperse their strategic mobile forces in many areas and were tied down in the mountain areas, in the lowlands, and in the cities, in Bac Bo, Trung Bo, and Nam Bo,, and in upper Laos, central Laos, lower Laos, and eastern Kampuchea. The Navarre plan was upset from the beginning. The offensive campaigns and attacks of the Vietnamese main-force troops and the guerrilla warfare activities on all battlefields were closely coordinated and harmonized with one another, under unified command and guidance, in order to enable one another to win victory and push the enemy ever more deeply into a status of strategic passivity from which they could not escape.

4. The Political Bureau of the VCP Central Committee and the High Command of the VPA concentrated their greatest efforts in order to win victory at any cost in a war-deciding strategic campaign at Dien Bien Phu and win a complete victory for the strategic offensive. As stated above, at first France did not intend to send troops to the northwestern jungles-and-mountains region, and the battle of Dien Bien Phu at first was not included in Navarre's military plan. But Vietnam forced Navarre to send the most elite French troops to the Dien Bien Phu basin. Vietnam created an opportunity and immediately took advantage of it by deciding to annihilate the enemy at Dien Bien Phu. When Navarre selected Dien Bien Phu as the site of a strategic war-deciding battle with Vietnam, Vietnam accepted a battle there and selected Dien Bien Phu as the site of the war-deciding strategic battle with the enemy. Vietnam concentrated most of its most elite main-force troops in that campaign, and the Vietnamese soldiers and people brilliantly fulfilled their mission.

5. The strategic offensive of Vietnam and the resistance war forces in Indochina was carried out harmoniously in all three theaters -- Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea -- under the conditions of the main-force troops of the

resistance war forces in Indochina not being large, the organizational scale of the units being small, there being a shortage of equipment and weapons, the principal mobility capability being feet, and communications facilities being very backward. The French and puppet main-force troops were more numerous and had more, and more modern, equipment, weapons, and war facilities. That was because the resistance war camp had the forces of all the people fighting the enemy, and included main-force troops, local troops, and extensive militia and guerrilla forces, which were formed into both mobile forces and on-the-spot forces and combined "conventional warfare" with "guerrilla warfare" and combat by main-force units with combat by the local armed forces in warfare by all the people, which created a position that was very advantageous for surrounding and attacking the enemy troops. The Vietnamese soldiers and troops had ardent patriotism, had gradually accumulated much additional experience in the course of the war, and always took the initiative in fighting the enemy and expanding the results of the fighting, even before the orders and directives of the upper echelon had been fully disseminated. That was also a lively result of the militant solidarity of the armies and people of the three Indochinese countries, the great assistance of the fraternal socialist countries, and the strong support of the world's people, including the progressive French people.

II

The Dien Bien Phu Campaign -- Some Campaign Art and Tactical Problems

Dien Bien Phu is a large valley in the western part of the mountainous Tay Bac region of Vietnam. It includes the Muong Thanh Plain, which is 18 km long and 6 to 8 km wide and is surrounded on all sides by high mountains and thick forests. Dien Bien Phu is located near the Vietnam-Laos border and 200 km from Luan Prabang in Laos. It is between 150 and 300 km from the borders of China, Burma, and Thailand, and is 300 to 500 km by land from the resistance war rear area in Bac Bo. The French and U.S. imperialists regarded Dien Bien Phu as an important strategic area that could become an effective ground forces-air force base in their war of aggression in Southeast Asia.

The enemy forces at Dien Bien Phu, which at first amounted to 6 battalions, gradually increased to 12 battalions and 6 infantry companies when the VPA offensive began. In the course of the campaign, the French High Command sent 4 airborne battalions and 12 airborne companies, a total of 17 infantry companies. Most of those forces were European-African units and the most elite paratroop units of the French Expeditionary Army in Indochina. In addition, there were three 105mm and 155mm artillery battalions, an engineer battalion, a tank company (10 M24 tanks), a 200-truck transportation company, and an air force squadron with 14 airplanes. The enemy had a total of 16,200 troops.

France transformed Dien Bien Phu into a campaign-scale complex of defensive strongpoints consisting of 49 positions organized into resistance centers and strongpoint clusters which were divided into three mutually supporting zones: the northern zone, the central zone, and the southern zone. In the central zone there were concentrated the enemy's principal defensive forces and strong

resistance centers, especially those on the hills to the east, with mobile forces, artillery and mechanized bases, and command posts and airfields. That vast defensive organization was a system of combat fortifications, underground communications tunnels, and a thick system of mixed obstacles. The U.S. imperialists also helped the French High Command set up an air lift connecting Dien Bien Phu with Hanoi. The French-U.S. high command concluded that the Dien Bien Phu strongpoint complex, a fortified bastion, was impregnable. They even boasted that if the VPA attacked there could be only one result: it would "commit suicide" and would certainly be defeated!(9)

The attacking forces of the VPA included 4 main-force divisions (the 308th, 316th, 312th, and 304th, minus the 66th Regiment), totalling 11 infantry regiments, and the 351st Artillery Division, consisting of a howitzer regiment (24 105mm howitzers), a mountain artillery regiment (20 75mm guns), 4 mortar companies (16 120mm mortars), a military engineer construction regiment, 4 antiaircraft battalions (48 37mm guns), and 2 12.7mm antiaircraft machinegun battalions. In the battle which concluded the campaign a DKZ battalion with six guns was added. Thus in comparison with previous campaigns the Vietnamese troops had a number of new weapons, which also surprised the enemy.

The forces participating in the VPA campaign prepared for the campaign in all respects on a large scale, in order to ensure the carrying out of the decision of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee and the High Command. They built roads to transport supplies and bring in artillery, built battlefield positions for the artillery and infantry; built fortified command posts for all echelons; made preparations with regard to supply and technical support; and organized reconnaissance to closely monitor the enemy's situation. The field grade and company grade units set aside time for supplementary tactical and technical training for the command cadres and enlisted men. In the summer, the troops gained experience by attacking strongpoint complexes at Na Son and, prior to that, in the Sam Nua campaign. The High Command carried out research, prepared training materials on attacking strongpoint complexes, and briefed the command cadres. The infantry units and technical combat arms underwent supplementary training regarding battlefield preparation and combined arms combat by the infantry and artillery in attacking enemy troops on the defensive in strongpoint complexes. The political work concentrated on teaching the troops to have a spirit of being determined to win, and on creating determination to win complete victory in the Dien Bien Phu campaign.

In general, the comparison of forces in the campaign tilted in favor of Vietnam. However, that superiority by the attacking side was only relative. With regard to infantry, the attacking side had twice as many troops and combat battalions (36 battalions to 17) than the defending side. With regard to artillery, the two sides had approximately the same number of guns and mortars, but the enemy had many times more artillery shells. As for the air force, tanks, mobility, supplies, rear services, and technical support, the defending side was far superior.

As stated above, on the basis of the strategic initiative developing in an increasingly favorable manner in the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring Campaign, and the

specific balance of forces between the two sides at Dien Bien Phu, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee decided to select Dien Bien Phu as the objective of the strategic offensive, concentrate most of the elite main-force units to carry out the largest offensive campaign in that strategic offensive, annihilate the strongest concentration of forces of the French aggressor forces at Dien Bien Phu, transform the war situation in a manner advantageous to the soldiers and people of Vietnam, and win a decisive victory in the anti-French resistance war. That was a wise, resolute, and bold strategic decision.

In order to victoriously carry out that decision, the High Command (which was at the same time the campaign command) successfully and creatively resolved many campaign art and tactical problems of a large-scale offensive campaign in the jungle-and-mountains theater. Notable among those problems was correctly determining the general fighting methods of the campaign and the method of attack to annihilate a large number of enemy troops in a system of relatively strong defensive positions on the scale of a campaign. Those things clearly reflect that the units of the Vietnamese people's armed forces knew how to fully utilize all of their equipment and weapons, brought into play their strengths, and exacerbated the enemy's weaknesses in order to defeat an enemy with more modern equipment, weapons, and war facilities.

At first, in December 1953, the campaign command set the preliminary guidelines, which were also the general fighting method of the campaign: attacking rapidly and winning a quick victory. At that time the enemy's defensive forces had not yet been reinforced and their defensive positions had not yet been completed and consolidated. The attacking side could exacerbate those limitations of the adversary, carry out a series of attacks on important objectives in the enemy's principal defensive zone, disperse and divide their principal defensive forces, then quickly annihilate all of the defensive forces in a few days and nights. By applying that fighting method the attacking side could have advantages in a number of respects, but from an over-all point of view it would not be advantageous and it would be difficult to attain the goals that had been set for the campaign. The relative superiority of the Vietnamese troops in the campaign was not sufficiently strong to create overwhelming offensive strength against a large enemy defensive force in a system of fortified positions. The principal assault force of the attacking side was still the infantry. If large forces were moved up and attacked the enemy in the open valley terrain they could easily suffer heavy losses because of the enemy's air force and artillery, which were superior. Without an air force or tanks, and with little artillery firepower, it would be difficult for the attacking side to break through the enemy's strongpoint clusters rapidly and continuously.

At 1100 on 25 January 1954 the campaign command decided to abandon the method of attacking rapidly and winning a quick victory and adopt the method of attacking certainly and advancing certainly. That was a very difficult decision for the campaign commanders to make, but has a correct, wise decision that was an important factor in determining victory.

In the afternoon of 25 January 1954 all campaign forces of the Vietnamese army were ordered to withdraw from their assault positions and return to the

assembly area. In order to mislead the enemy troops and protect the concentration of the campaign forces in accordance with the new decision, the campaign command ordered the 308th Division to coordinate with the Pathet Lao army in attacking the enemy in the vicinity of Luang Prabang on the Nam Hu River defensive line, as discussed above.

In applying the fighting method of attacking certainly and advancing certainly, the Vietnamese army units participating in the campaign had to make meticulous preparations in all regards; gradually create a status of advancing solidly and surrounding and dividing the enemy's defensive forces; and fight a series of battles, one after the other, with highly concentrated forces and facilities in each battle, in order to ensure the annihilation of each resistance center and each cluster of enemy strongpoints, accompanied by the restricting and cutting off their sources of supplies and cutting off their sources of supplies and reinforcements, and advancing to the annihilation of all enemy troops.

The preparatory work had to be done again, with strong determination on the part of the cadres and men, by means of specific, resolute measures. It was necessary to overcome many difficulties caused by the changing of the campaign's fighting methods and the new campaign operational plan. It was necessary to reconstruct the campaign's system of offensive battlefield positions, especially the system of artillery positions, roads for mechanized facilities, and the assault positions of the large and small units. We had to redeploy the campaign's formation and the forces and facilities in the directions of attack: assign missions to and organize coordination among the infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft, and military engineer forces, and among the directions of attack; draft campaign and battle documents and disseminate them to the commanders and units; and carry out the education and motivation work to cause the troops to approve of the change in the campaign's fighting methods and plans, and have strong determination to victoriously fulfill the campaign's missions. Especially, the preparatory work concentrated on overcoming the difficulties of transporting much greater quantities of food and materiel than originally planned, far from the strategic rear area and in the jungles-and-mountains region during the rainy season.

After the Vietnamese campaign forces had completed their preparatory work, when the French command still thought that the Vietnamese had abandoned their intention to attack Dien Bien Phu, the first offensive of the Dien Bien Phu campaign began. At 1700 on 13 March 1954 the units of the 312th Division, with strong artillery support, attacked and took the Him Lam strongpoints. For the first time in Vietnam the enemy artillery was suppressed and paralyzed. The enemy aircraft had to operate at an altitude of 3,000 feet to avoid the anti-aircraft firepower of the attacking side. During the night and early morning of 15 March 1954 the units of the 308th and 312th divisions coordinated in attacking and wiping out the resistance centers on Doc Lap hill. The enemy counterattacks were repulsed. The enemy at the Ban Keo strongpoint surrendered.

In the course of 5 days and nights 2,000 enemy troops in the northern sector were wiped out. The door was opened to the Muong Thanh central defensive zone. The enemy airfield was threatened by both the artillery and direct-fire firepower of the Vietnamese troops. The encirclement of the enemy troops was further tightened.

The construction of offensive positions in accordance with the fighting method of attacking certainly and advancing certainly created conditions for the attacking units to rapidly, secretly, and unexpectedly approach the enemy with few losses. The artillery, which were deployed in a new system of positions, maintained secrecy and surprise when supporting the infantry and suppressing enemy artillery. The attacks on each resistance center and strongpoint cluster of the enemy allowed the attacking side to concentrate forces and facilities, especially artillery firepower, so that it could have sufficient strength to annihilate clusters of enemy troops in relatively strong fortifications.

The second offensive of the campaign began during the night of 30 March 1954. The attacks were launched against enemy troops defending five hilltop positions east of the Muong Thanh central zone, which were some of the enemy's principal defensive clusters. The attacks were carried out by the forces of the 312th and 316th divisions. The 308th Division coordinated its activities by pinning down the enemy in the central zone. The 304th Division pinned down the enemy in the southern zone and prevented them from reinforcing the central zone. The attacks were fierce and lasted until nearly the end by April 1954. The enemy troops reacted insanely by means of infantry counterattacks and strong air force and artillery firepower. One day the enemy used 250 bombers and fighters to attack the positions of the attacking troops. They concentrated air power to fiercely attack Vietnam's transportation and supply lines. The attacking units could only completely take three hilltop positions: only half of the C1 and A1 high points could be taken.

By means of the second offensive, the Vietnamese troops annihilated more than 2,500 enemy troops and broke through the barrier protecting the enemy's central zone. The system of offensive and surrounding positions moved close to the central sector, thus bringing the headquarters of General Decastries into the range of the direct-fire artillery. The main enemy airfield was taken and intersected by combat trenches and infantry forces of the attacking side. The central sector and southern sector of the enemy were divided and completely cut off and surrounded. The strongpoints on the outer perimeter of the central sector were surrounded and threatened by the firepower of the machineguns and rifles of the attacking units. Some of the strongpoints were wiped out or forced to surrender.

The building and development of the system of offensive and siege positions ensured that the Vietnamese army could move a large force up close, attack and tightly surround the enemy troops, cut off and isolate their units and strongpoint clusters on both a campaign and tactical scale, on open terrain and under the conditions of Vietnam having no air force and France having overwhelming superiority with regard to firepower. Thanks to that system of battlefield positions, the campaign forces could move easily, secretly, and safely both day and night, maintained ordinary life under the conditions of prolonged combat, greatly reduced the casualty rate, and moved close to the enemy, in some places to a distance of only 10 to 15 meters. Therefore, after the second series of attacks the Muong Thanh defensive sector was reduced to less than four square km and lay within the range of the firepower of the attackers. Picks and shovels were regarded as weapons and trenches were implements which protected the lives of the cadres and men. The units dug

hundreds of km of combat trenches and communication trenches despite the artillery firepower and napalm of the enemy. The system of attack and siege positions was gradually built and developed in the course of the campaign and steadily completed the components, such as fire points, combat fortifications, mobility trenches, sleeping bunkers, ammunition bunkers, medical aid bunkers, etc. That was a project of creative labor which manifested the will, determination, and intelligence of the Vietnamese cadres and men in that campaign.

The previous two series of attacks prepared the way for the third series of attacks, beginning on 1 May 1954. The Vietnamese troops took the remainder of the defensive strongpoints of the enemy to the east, reduced the area held by the enemy to the west, then changed over to an all-out attack. At exactly 1500 on 7 May the units of the VPA advanced from the east and west directly to the headquarters of General Decastries at Muong Thanh. There were still about 10,000 of the enemy but their morale had collapsed. As the troops advanced the enemy came out with white flags and surrendered. At 1730 the enemy headquarters were taken. General Decastries and the entire staff of the Dien Bien Phu strongpoint complex were captured. The remaining enemy troops laid down their weapons and surrendered. During that night the other units also began to attack the enemy's southern sector in the Hong Cum area. More than 2,000 of the enemy who were fleeing toward upper Laos were intercepted and captured.

All of the enemy troops at Dien Bien Phu were wiped out. The historic Dien Bien Phu campaign won a complete victory.

A tactical matter of decisive importance in developing the campaign was coordinated combat among a number of combat arms of the VPA -- infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft, and combat engineers -- to attack and annihilate the enemy in the jungles-and-mountains theater, in resistance centers and large strongpoint clusters, and defeat counterattacks by the enemy troops, in order to surround the enemy, cut them off from the air, and defend and keep the areas we took. For the first time the combat arms of the Vietnamese army successfully resolved that problem on the scale of a campaign.

Combined arms combat was organized and carried out well in each battle, with different specific missions and objectives. Outstanding were the battles in which there was cooperation among the infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft, and military engineer units in order to annihilate one or many enemy battalions on the defensive in resistance centers or large strongpoint complexes, such as Doc Lap Hill, the Him Lam complex, and the defensive zone of the hills to the east. Despite the lack of tanks and an airforce, and limited artillery firepower, the battles created strong assault force by means of the direct firepower of the organic artillery, the direct firepower of the infantry, and explosives, in order to open paths through the systems of obstacles and penetrate the enemy positions, with limited artillery support. The methods of close-in fighting, night fighting, and the good use of approach trenches reduced movement on open terrain under enemy firepower and made possible the rapid breach of enemy positions.

The enemy counterattacks in the course of the campaign were also defeated by the combined strength of the combat arms. Exemplary was the battle to smash the enemy counterattack on 24 April 1954 to retake the airfield. The infantry detachments took advantage of the terrain and effectively used their firepower, in combination with direct artillery fire against the enemy tanks and sometimes with the use of anti-aircraft artillery, the use of long-range shelling by artillery in concealed positions, the use of combat engineers to lay mines to stop enemy infantry and tanks, etc.

Combined arms combat was also used to surround the enemy, cut them off from the air, and limit and eventually eliminate the enemy's ability to reinforce and resupply by air. The anti-aircraft artillery shot down enemy aircraft or forced them to fly at high altitudes so that they could not drop parachutes accurately. The surface artillery (including direct-fire artillery) destroyed the airfield, the airplanes parked there, and airplanes which were landing, thus preventing airplanes from taking off or landing. It shelled and destroyed the command posts and shelled enemy troops repairing the airfield and unloading cargo. The infantry took the airfield, which prevented the enemy from dropping parachutes accurately, and shelled enemy troops who went out to pick up supplies dropped by air.

Combined arms combat in attacking, in coping with enemy counterattacks, and in defensive combat signified a new tactical advance for the main-force units of the VPA in that campaign.

Vietnam successfully resolved the problem of cutting off reinforcements and supplies by air, while at the same time doing a good job of reinforcing its troops and transporting food and ammunition for the campaign.

The enemy troops at Dien Bien Phu relied exclusively on airlifted reinforcements and supplies. Therefore, it was necessary to restrict and eventually eliminate those sources of reinforcements and supplies. The encirclement and airlift blockade by anti-aircraft firepower, artillery firepower, and the infantry contributed importantly to the fulfillment of that mission. Especially, during the second series of attacks the attack and encirclement positions of the VPA advanced close to the central sector, took the main airfield, and reduced the area held by the enemy. Essentially, the enemy's air supply line had been cut. Enemy troops risked death by parachuting in as reinforcements, and food and ammunition were dropped. But because the area controlled by the enemy was too small, some of them fell into areas controlled by the attackers. The ammunition that was collected (5,500 artillery rounds) was used immediately to attack the enemy. The captured food was used immediately to supplement the units' daily rations. Expert sniper teams prevented the enemy troops from picking up the supplies dropped by airplanes.(10) The loss of their source of supply and reinforcement pushed the enemy into a situation of confusion and chaos. The cutting off of the enemy's rear-services support and supplies was a great success and outstanding experience of the Vietnamese troops in the Dien Bien Phu campaign.

On the part of Vietnam, although the enemy attacked fiercely from the air, and despite having overcome many difficulties caused by heavy rain and long supply

lines, we still ensured the prompt supplying of food, medicine, and new forces for a long campaign which consumed the greatest volume of materiel ever. The Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee issued a resolution calling on "the entire population, the entire Party, and the government to go all-out in providing aid for the Dien Bien Phu campaign and do everything necessary to win complete victory for that campaign."(11) When the enemy damaged roads the Vietnamese forces -- troops, assault youth, and civilian laborers -- repaired them, built new roads, and fully utilized both land and river routes. We also used all kinds of transportation facilities, both modern and primitive, and especially brought into play the role of mechanized transportation (which accounted for the largest transportation volume of any campaign -- 85 percent). That greatly increased the transportation and supply capability and volume. Combining the mobilization of on-the-spot rear services capabilities with bringing in supplies from the strategic rear area contributed to quickly meeting the needs of the campaign.(12) Especially, fighting to prevent the enemy from damaging roads or interdicting the transporting of supplies for the campaign, and the repairing of roads at the important transportation hubs and at rugged passes attained good results and enabled the supply lines to remain open under all situations. That represented very great effort on the part of the people in the rear areas and in the task of ensuring rear services and supplies for the campaign.(13)

In the Dien Bien Phu campaign and in the 1953-1954 winter-spring strategic offensive, the political-morale superiority of the Vietnamese soldiers and people was developed to a high degree, while the mortal political-morale weakness of the French aggressor army was greatly exacerbated. The political-morale superiority of the Vietnamese soldiers and people became one of the factors which determined victory.

The cadres and men of the VPA set innumerable good examples with regard to a heroic, resolute fighting will and the revolutionary heroism of an army that fights for the independence and freedom of the homeland for the well-being of the people. That fighting will was manifested in the form of very heroic specific actions and many creative fighting methods: bravely assaulting to annihilate enemy troops in fortifications; actively building works to surround and divide the enemy troops; and actively fighting enemy airplanes, defending positions, defeating the enemy counterattacks, etc. To Vinh Dien, who used his body to prevent an artillery piece from rolling down hill; Be Van Dau, who used his body as a gun mount; and Phan Dinh Giot, who blocked a bunker entrance with his body, etc., were outstanding examples. Tens of thousands of cadres and men who participated in the campaign overcame countless difficulties and hardships to fulfill their missions and achieve brilliant feats of arms.

The people in the free areas, as well as those in the temporarily occupied areas, went all-out to serve the front, fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the armed forces, and fully achieved the slogan, "All for the front, all for victory." The VCP's policy of carrying out rent reduction and land reform during the very time when the fierce test of strength between the two sides was taking place at Dien Bien Phu played a great role in strengthening patriotism and raising the level of class consciousness of the soldiers and people of Vietnam and in mobilizing the manpower and materiel of all regions of the nation for the Dien Bien Phu campaign and for the entire strategic offensive.

The party work and the political work played a very important role in motivating and strengthening the troops' fighting will, so that they could be determined to victoriously fulfill the missions of the campaign. They reached each cadre, enlisted man, party chapter, and company, concentrated on education and control, and on fulfilling such specific missions as fulfilling combat missions; bringing into play the positiveness and creativity of the soldiers and men to find effective fighting methods; enforcing battlefield discipline; implementing policies regarding wounded soldiers, war dead, POW's, and defectors; maintaining the troops' living conditions under complicated, arduous fighting conditions; consolidating party chapters and educating and developing party members, etc., in the course of fulfilling missions. Especially, a resolute struggle was waged against rightist, negative thoughts that arose in the course of the long, fierce combat with the enemy. That struggle contributed directly to strengthening the spirit of being determined to fight and win and motivated the troops to rush forward to fulfill their missions and win complete victory for the campaign.

From the victory of the Vietnamese army and people in the Dien Bien Phu campaign it is possible to make the following observations regarding the campaign, campaign art, and tactics:

1. The Dien Bien Phu campaign reflected the greatest efforts on the part of the soldiers and people of Vietnam to victoriously fulfill their strategic mission in the concluding phase of the anti-French resistance war. If the 1953-1954 winter-spring strategic offensive represented the greatest efforts on the part of the people and armed forces of Vietnam in the 9-year resistance war against the French colonialist aggressors, the Dien Bien Phu campaign was a concentrated manifestation of those efforts. That campaign was carried out with great determination by the most elite main-force units of the VPA using a large volume of weapons and technical equipment, some of them new, and applying new, advanced tactical methods. It was directly guided and commanded by the Political Bureau, President Ho, and the High Command. The battlefields all over the nation coordinated very closely with the Dien Bien Phu campaign. Especially, the people all over the nation looked toward Dien Bien Phu, strongly encouraged "the Dien Bien Phu warriors," made the greatest possible contributions of manpower and materiel, and ensured that the campaign had sufficient strength to defeat the enemy.
2. The Dien Bien Phu campaign, the largest offensive campaign fought in the jungles-and-mountains theater, won the VPA's most glorious victory in the long struggle against the French aggressor army, which was aided by the United States. For the first time the VPA successfully organized and carried out a large-scale campaign over a long period of time by a relatively complete complement of main-force units. It was also an offensive campaign which attained the highest effectiveness in annihilating the enemy. It wiped out one of the largest and strongest concentrations of enemy troops and smashed a new type of defensive formation -- a strongpoint complex -- the highest type of defensive organization of the French expeditionary army in Indochina at that time. The Dien Bien Phu campaign included some elements of modern campaigns and coordinated combat by a number of ground forces branches in the jungles-and-mountains theater. It was a new development in the campaign art of

Vietnamese peoples art in the anti-French resistance war.

3. The Dien Bien Phu campaign exemplified the art of correct, resolute, and flexible guidance and command, manifested in the organization of battles which followed one after another, were interspersed, and were closely combined, and the creative resolution of problems regarding the general fighting methods of campaigns and tactical problems of significance to campaigns, such as determining correct guidelines and methods of fighting certainly and advancing certainly, the art of attacking to annihilate large enemy forces in relatively strong defensive positions despite the lack of airplanes and tanks, and prompt guidance of the troops' thought and acts in the course of the campaign. It was also the first time we organized supplying and transportation on a large scale by combining the various modes and facilities in mountainous terrain and under the conditions of fierce attacks by the enemy air force, thus ensuring the continuous reinforcement of units and the supplying of sufficient amounts of food, weapons, and ammunition for the campaign.

Between the 1953-1954 winter-spring campaign -- the high point of which was the Dien Bien Phu campaign -- to the strategic offensive of the spring of 1975, the high point of which was the Ho Chi Minh campaign, the soldiers and people of Vietnam experienced one-fifth of a century of arduous, fierce patriotic war against the cruel war of aggression waged by the U.S. imperialists.

The soldiers and people of Vietnam victoriously coped with the very modern combat arms and armed forces branches of the U.S. aggressor army and its lackeys, in both the war to liberate the south and the war to defend the socialist regime in the north. Vietnam's anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation won a complete victory. Vietnamese military art underwent new, rich development; it had a profound popular nature but at the same time its modern elements were increasingly strengthened.

The soldiers and people of Vietnam also gained new experience in war to defend the homeland and in opposing the war of aggression waged by the Beijing reactionaries along the southern borders.

In the present enterprise of defending the homeland the commanding generals, officers, and men of the Vietnamese people's armed forces are continuing to develop and perfect their military art, and create military art of people's war to defend the socialist Vietnamese homeland under modern conditions.

We pay much attention to our past experience and seek ways to apply and develop it in a manner appropriate to the mission of defending the homeland against the new enemy aggressors and to the new conditions and circumstances of our country and army. The Vietnam People's Army of today has been equipped with many modern weapons and war facilities provided by the Soviet Union. We have also studied many valuable experiences and advanced military knowledge of the superior military science and art of the Soviet Union. We are certain to successfully fulfill the missions we have set for ourselves.

On this occasion I would like to convey to the commanding generals, officers, and men of the Army and Navy of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, and to the journal VOENNI MISL of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, our sincere thanks for

the effective, unselfish aid, in a spirit of socialist internationalism, given by the party, government, people, and armed forces of the Soviet Union to the soldiers and people of Vietnam.

FOOTNOTES

1. The 1953-1954 Winter-Spring strategic offensive annihilated 112,000 of the enemy on the various battlefields, captured 19,000 weapons of all types, shot down 177 airplanes, and liberated many highly populated, rich areas in the Bac Bo lowlands, in Trung Bo, and in Nam Bo. In the Dien Bien Phu battle the VPA annihilated or captured 16,200 of the enemy. The enemy troops wiped out amounted to 17 infantry battalions and paratroop battalions of three regular brigades, 3 artillery battalions, and a combat engineer battalion, a total of 21 battalions, plus all of the technical equipment of the Dien Bien Phu strongpoint complex.
2. Exemplary victories of the Vietnamese people in the history of opposing Chinese aggressors during the feudal period.
3. For example, the Midlands Campaign, the Route 18 Campaign, and the Ha Nam Ninh Campaign in 1951, the Hoa Binh Campaign in the winter of 1951 and the spring of 1952, and the Tay Bac Campaign in the winter of 1952.
4. As of 15 November 1953 Vietnam's main-force troops totalled 110 battalions, compared to France's 284 battalions. In December 1953 Vietnam had 90 battalions in the Bac Bo theater, compared to France's 130 battalions.
5. D'Argenlieu and Pignon were French High Commissioners in Indochina, Revers was the Chief of Staff of the French Army, who went to Indochina to observe the situation in 1949, and Tassigny was a famous French general who was sent to Indochina after the French defeat on the northern border of Vietnam in 1950.
5. The French war in Indochina between 1945 and 1954 is usually called the "First Indochina War." The U.S. war in Indochina between 1955 and 1975 is called the "Second Indochina War."
6. Navarre was the commander-in-chief of the French Corps Expeditionnaire in Indochina after 1953 (when he replaced General Salan).
7. Navarre intended to create in 1953 and 1954 a mobile force amounting to seven divisions, including six infantry divisions and an airborne division, with a total of 27 regiments.
8. In the lowlands there was not only guerrilla warfare but also a number of campaigns carried out by main-force troops in combination with the local armed forces. For example, in the Bac Bo lowlands, in January 1954, in order to coordinate with the main front the 320th Division attacked to wipe out the enemy and smash the Day River defense line. Then, along with the 42nd, 46th, 50th, 246th, and 238th main-force regiments, the local armed forces developed the attack into important areas deep behind enemy lines.
9. The U.S. general O'Daniel visited Dien Bien Phu and expressed "satisfaction" over the French defensive organization there.

10. One sniper broke a record by killing 30 of the enemy in a single day. The mountain artillery gun crew of Phung Van Khau, on Hill D1, knocked out four 105mm howitzers.
11. The resolution of the Political Bureau of the VCP Central Committee, 19 April 1954, regarding the Dien Bien Phu battle.
12. Mobilized 7,300 tons of rice locally in the newly liberated Tay Bac areas.
13. According to data supplied by the Front's Central Supply Council, during the 1953-1954 winter-spring strategic offensive Vietnam mobilized nearly 40,000 tons of rice and thousands of tons of foodstuffs, more than 500,000 civilian laborers, 23,000 pack bicycles, and more than 4,000 boats and other transportation forces. In the Dien Bien Phu campaign there were mobilized 25,000 tons of rice, more than 260,000 civilian laborer, 20,000 pack bicycles, more than 17,000 packhorses, and nearly 2,700 boats.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

MILITARY REGION 2 SAID DETERMINED TO RESIST CHINESE

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Apr 84 pp 30-39, 62

[Article by Lt Gen Vu Lap: "Soldiers and Ethnic Minority People in Military Region 2 Determined to Defeat War of Destruction"]

[Text] Military Region 2 consists of five provinces: Ha Tuyen, Hoang Lien Son, Lai Chau, Son La, and Vinh Phu. It has a national border 1,394 km long, 784 of which are shared with China. It has an area of 64,631 square kilometers, one-fifth of the nation's total area. In Military Region 2 there are many high mountains, such as Hoang Lien Son (31143 meters), Pu Si Lung (3,076 meters), Pu Ta Leng (2,987 meters), Pu Kho Luong (2,810 meters), etc.; many large rivers, such as the Red, Da, and Lo; and many immense plains, valleys, and plateaus, such as the Muong Thanh, Nghia Lo, Quang Huy, and Than Uyen plains, the Dien Bien, Tuan Giao, Muong Lay, and Tam Duong valleys, and the Dong Van, Chau Moc, Ta Sin Chai, and Ta Phinh plateaus.

The terrain in Military Region 2 consists of jungles and mountains, mostly mountains, so it is rugged, divided by many rivers and streams, and has high passes, steep slopes, one-lane roads, and severe weather.

The economies of the provinces in the military region are mountain-region and midland economies with many native products and the various kinds of industrial crops, medicinal crops, and precious special products. There are such industrial installations as apatite mines, electricity generating plants, plants producing chemicals, paper, textiles, MSG, superphosphate, and batteries, and processing fruit, tea, etc., concentrated primarily in Vinh Phu and Hoang Lien Son. The many unexploited natural resources are a great strength which has not yet been brought into play.

The military region has a population of more than 3.9 million and includes 39 ethnic groups. Fifty-two percent of the population are members of ethnic minorities. The population is not distributed evenly: Vinh Phu has the greatest population density (1,170 people per square km), while Lai Chau Province has the lowest (14 people per square km). Muong Te District has a density of only four people per square km.

The ethnic minority people in the military region have long lived together and united with the community of ethnic groups in Vietnam in a long course of struggle to build and defend the nation. In the 13th Century the area was the

scene of the first war-deciding battles against the Yuan-Mongolian aggressors, which manifested the indomitable, resourceful fighting spirit to kill the enemy on the part of the local ethnic minority people, which was recorded in the golden pages of our country's history by the praising poetic words of king Tran Thai Thon: "The South has a strong spirit and the northern bandits are terrified." In the 15th Century, the area coordinated closely with the Chi Lang victory, stopped and repulsed the Moc Thanh column of the Ming troops, and defended the homeland. Since being led by the Party, the ethnic minority people have united as one with the Party, followed the revolution, nurtured and protected the cadres, set up liberated areas, and created such famous base areas as the Tan Trao, Van Duc, Van Thang and other war zones. The children of ethnic minority people participated enthusiastically in the armed forces. There were such outstanding ethnic minority guerrilla units as those of the Ho Mong people in Pu Nhunng and Tu Le; companies which infiltrated deeply to attack the enemy, such as the Kim Son, Thang Binh, and Long Giang companies, the 529th and 48th battalions, etc. During the anti-French resistance war the soldiers and people of Military Region 2 contributed importantly to such major, historic campaigns as the Song Lo victory (autumn-winter 1947), which shattered a large pincers operation in the direction of Viet Bac; the border campaign (autumn-winter 1950); and the winter-spring campaign of 1953-1954, which concluded with the splendid Dien Bien Phu victory.

During the anti-U.S. resistance war the soldiers and people of the ethnic groups in the military region gloriously fulfilled the mission of a rear area military region, firmly maintained political security in the border area, contributed to defeating the war of destruction waged by the air force of the U.S. imperialists, went all-out to provide manpower and materiel for the great front line in the south, and contributed worthily to fulfilling the international obligation of our soldiers and people toward the national salvation enterprise of the fraternal Laotian people.

After the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists adopted a policy of enmity toward us, Military Region 2 became an importnt doorway and shield in an importnt strategic area of the nation in the enterprise of national defense. In the war of aggression started by the Chinese bandits in February 1979 in the nothern part of our country, the ethnic groups of military Region 2 united as one, retaliated fiercely, and gradually repulsed a major attack of an enemy column of more than 200,000 troops. In the course of 30 days and nights of resolute combat the soldiers and people of Military Region 2, bringing into play the great combined strength of people's war in their area, annihilated nearly 20,000 of the enemy, destroyed 70 tanks and armored vehicles, 190 trucks, 30 artillery pieces, etc., contested each hill top, stream, bridge, etc., and smashed many enemy attacks. Despite having to cope with an enemy army many times larger, with their strength and determination to defend the nation, and with the aid and encouragement of the entire nation, the soldiers and people of Military Region 2, along with the soldiers and people of the northern border area, struck the enemy with well-deserved blows, forced them to flee, defended the military region, and contributed to stoutly defending the homeland.

Heavily defeated, but with the evil intention of weakening and annexing Vietnam, the reactionary Beijing clique is feverishly waging a many-sided war

of destruction while at the same time preparing for large-scale armed aggression against our country. Military Region 2, face to face with the enemy troops, is one of the areas which must cope directly with all schemes of the enemy to carry out sabotage, infiltration, and armed provocations, and to create tension along the border. Across from Military Region 2 the enemy continually maintain a large military force, right up against the border and deployed in three echelons:

-- The border echelon, with border defense posts, border defense regiments, bandit gangs, and militia forces of the communes along the border. Along that line the enemy directly carry out all sorts of sabotage activities against us on a daily basis.

-- On second echelon, 50 km from the border, there are stationed local divisions and border defense divisions which directly support the first echelon.

-- The third echelon, that of the main-force corps of the Kunming Military Region.

That deployment is intended to cope with both types of warfare in the enemy's nefarious plots: a many-sided war of destruction and a large-scale war of aggression.

With large regular forces along the border which continually practice combined arms combat according to the different modes, actively building fortifications and positions, building up supplies, and continually strengthening support capabilities, the enemy are always in a status of readiness to invade our country when they feel that they are capable of doing so. By means of border defense forces, local troops, militia, and the other on-the-spot forces, they continually engage in sabotage warfare activities and feverishly carry out insidious, devious plots against the border area of Military Region 2.

Militarily, they are promoting armed provocation activities, from reconnaissance and commando activities and small surprise attacks to encroachment by regimental units, many regiments, and artillery. On the average, every year there are about 350 large and small armed provocations in the border areas of Military Region 2.

With regard to psychological warfare, they use 11 clusters of extremely powerful loudspeakers to spit venom across to our country every day. During the past several years they have flung into the border areas of Military Region 2 millions of leaflets, consisting of 82 types and with 130 different contents, by many different means: mortar shells, sending them across on rafts, floating them down rivers and streams, etc., in order to spread false information, distort the stands and policies of our Party and state, falsely accuse our leaders, smear our regime, slander, lie, attempt to create division among the ethnic groups and between the soldiers and people, appeal for our troops to desert, etc.

With regard to espionage warfare, in addition to carrying out reconnaissance and espionage to collect our political, economic, and military secrets, they

have paid much attention to infiltrating spies to establish ties with or to create infrastructures in our interior and within our ranks.

Economically, they take advantage of our difficulties, deficiencies, and shortcomings by providing items necessary for the production and lives of the ethnic minority people, such as plows, hoes, knives, cloth, salt, medicine, etc. They send goods across the border in hopes of bribing and winning over credulous people and control us politically, ideologically, and organizationally. They have also set up "ghost markets" to exchange goods for strategic raw materials in hopes of sabotaging production and carrying out economic and political sabotage in our country's border areas.

In Military Region 2, like the other areas along the northern border, the war of destruction being waged feverishly by the Chinese ruling clique against our people is taking place in many spheres: economic, military, ideological, etc. But because of the special characteristics of the Military Region 2 border area, where there are nearly 40 different ethnic groups, the Chinese reactionaries are concentrating on seeking ways to carry out their nefarious plots to create division, disintegrate the ethnic solidarity bloc, incite one ethnic group to oppose another, set up reactionary infrastructures, and attack our Party, the governmental administration, and the military-civilian solidarity bloc.

They combine the various kinds of activities in attacking us, combine external military pressure with encouraging internal uprisings by reactionaries, combine psychological warfare with espionage warfare, and attack the mass organizations, the Party organizations, and the governmental organizations. They are also endeavoring to assemble, harbor, and use local bandits, traitors, and deserters to form bandit groups, and have given them such labels as "Hoang Van Hoan guerrillas," "National Salvation Youth," etc. They have sent them across the border to carry out sabotage and support their infrastructures.

Their plots are extremely insidious. Their schemes are extremely cunning, and are both cynical and sophisticated. They hope to confuse the situation along the border, create political-ideological chaos, and break up the basic-level political infrastructure, in combination with military pressure from the other side of the border, to carry out their basic plot of annexing our country's border areas and win a big victory without fighting big battles.

Military Region 2 in general, and its border areas specifically, constitute one of the key regions in the war of destruction waged by the reactionary Chinese rulers against our country. In order to defeat that war of destruction it is necessary to develop the military region into a region that is strong politically, economically, and with regard to national defense, into an inviolable defense line in the north of our country. The resolution of the Fifth Party Congress stated that "It is necessary to develop the mountain-region provinces and districts and enable them to develop notably in all regards." The Political Bureau has also pointed out that with regard to the northern border areas, in addition to teaching the people to realize the dangerous, insidious, wily nature and plots of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, strengthen their vigilance, and distinguish clearly between

friends and enemies, it is necessary to "strictly implement the Party's ethnic policy and gradually meet the essential needs of the material and cultural lives of the ethnic minority people...launch a mass movement, and continue to build and consolidate people's security and national defense by all the people."

Along those lines, the military region party committee, the provincial party committees, the armed forces, and the ethnic minority people in Military Region 2 have, during the past several years, united closely, struggled, and achieved development with regard to economics, national defense, political security and social order and safety, culture, and life. The people's collective mastership right was brought into play. The close relationships between the army and the people, and between the army and the public security forces, the party organizations and governmental organizations, and the sectors of the state system were maintained and strengthened, and great combined strength was created in the military region in defeating the enemy's many-sided war of destruction.

Since it is a military region which directly copes with the enemy, the missions of strengthening national defense, building a battlefield position of strongly defending the borders of the homeland, defeating the enemy's war of destruction, and being prepared to defeat their wars of aggression, no matter on what scale or under what circumstances, are always foremost political missions.

The problem that is posed for Military Region 2 is how to bring into play the socialist collective mastership right of nearly 4 million ethnic minority people in the miliary region, and create great strength in the enterprise of building and defending the homeland, strongly defending the home area, the villages, and the hamlets, and defending the sacred borders of the homeland. That strength, combined with the strength of the armed forces in the military region, is peerless strength which is entirely capable of defeating the expansionist, hegemonic enemy anywhere, at all times, and in all types of wars of aggression. For that reason, achieving ethnic solidarity and motivating the people of the ethnic groups to serve as the masters in the enterprise of defending the locality are matters of strategic importance to the soldiers and people of Miliary Region 2.

Ethnic solidarity and military-civilian solidary are always great strengths of the soldiers and people of Military Region 2. In the present war of destruction, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists regard that as their number-one objective. Therefore, solidarity is not only a fine tradition that must be developed, but also poses many new contents which are appropriate to the enterprise of developing the revolutionary situation and missions, and to the characteristics and missions of the soldiers and people of the military region in the great undertaking of building socialism in the localities and in the present fierce struggle against the enemy, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. Solidarity in order to simultaneously carry out the three revolutions, build the system of socialist collective mastership and the socialist economy, build national defense by all the people, strengthen national defense, and maintain political security and social order and safety. Only by successfully building socialism and the independence and freedom of the

homeland is it possible to ensure solidity, and only then can the mountain region catch up with the lowlands and be well-off. And vice versa, only with powerful national defense and a strong defended border is it possible to defend peaceful labor and the construction of socialism. That is a content of ethnic solidarity and military-civilian solidarity. It is the inevitable path of development of the ethnic groups along the northern border and is also the firm basis on which to defeat the enemy, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

Therefore, a major problem that is continually posed is to pay attention to educating the soldiers and people, especially the ethnic minority people, in the border areas so that they can clearly realize the insidious nature and plots of the enemy, and create deep hatred and a spirit of vigilance and determination to expose and defeat all of their plots. In creating district military fortresses along the border, a major task carried out by Military Region 2 has been to "encourage the people to expose the enemy and distinguish clearly between the enemy and ourselves." In the course of that campaign, many old people of the Ho Mong ethnic group related the historical origins of their ethnic group, the bloody crimes committed by the Chinese dynasties and the "Greater Han" rulers against the Ho Mong ethnic group, and the historic merger of the Ho Mong ethnic group with the community of Vietnamese ethnic groups over the course of many centuries. In the clan records still retained by the Ho Mong ethnic group, there is a very profound admonition for the descendants, "Banana leaves are not silk and Chinese can never be friends" (i.e. those who follow "Great Hanism").

Because they have been deeply educated, the ethnic minority people have realized more and more clearly the schemes and plots of the enemy, so they have advanced from vagueness and confusing the enemy with ourselves, and from not daring to speak out, to voluntarily stepping forth to expose the enemy and their schemes to divide the ethnic minority groups. Because they were motivated, many people who formerly fed and concealed guerrillas in their houses or supplied them, now denounced the, arrested them and turned them over to the militia and public security forces.

The border is the doorway to the entire nation. The entire nation is concerned about the border: the border areas must, for the sake of the entire nation, heighten their mastership spirit and ability, strongly defend each inch of the homeland, and not wait for or excessively depend on others. During the past several years, because it brought into play the collective mastership strength of the soldiers and people of the military region in the enterprise of building and defending the homeland, Ha Tuyen was able to create a movement to intensively cultivate crops, promote production, meet its grain needs, and surpass the over-all grain obligation norm assigned it. In addition to Ha Tuyen, Hoan Lien Son is also a province which had a successful 10th month harvest and attained the highest yields ever. Vinh Phu was one of the first provinces in the nation to have complete plans and measures to protect, develop, and use forests and hill land in order to gradually meet essential consumer needs, grow rich by means of forestry, and comprehensively develop the economy. Promoting production, meeting local grain needs, and maintaining and stabilizing the living conditions of millions of people in the high-altitude mountainous areas along the border have been great accomplishments of the

ethnic minority people in Military Region 2. That is not merely an economic matter but is also a matter of political security and strengthening national defense.

Manifesting a spirit as serving as the masters in the enterprise of defending the locality, the women of Ha Tuyen have paid attention to propagandizing and educating the women of 20 ethnic groups in the province so that they can clearly understand the enemy's schemes and plots and strengthen their vigilance. The Women's Federation echelons organized the ethnic minority women in implementing the "border security family" agreements and opposing the enemy's psychological warfare. Seventy thousand women of the ethnic groups in the province were awarded the title, "New Woman in Building and Defending the Homeland." Hoang Lien Son has sent hundreds of cadres of the sectors and echelons to build a people's defense line to defend the homeland and has promptly provided brief, concise, easily understood materials about the enemy's schemes and plots for wide dissemination among the people. The party committees and governmental administrations of the border villages continually hold "military-civilian solidarity" and "ethnic solidarity" conferences and organize "crime denunciation" nights in order to continually strengthen military-civilian solidarity and ethnic solidarity, expose the enemy, and not allow the enemy to incite and divide. The ethnic group people in Bat Xat, Muong Khuong, and Bac Ha districts drafted specific regulations opposing bribery and persuasion by the enemy.

The strength of collective mastership was developed positively in the enterprise of building and defending the homeland in the localities in the military zone. That strength must be more fully developed on the combat front and in combat readiness and opposition to the enemy's many-sided war of destruction by each unit, village, hamlet, family, clan, and individual. Each district, city, and village in the border areas must be a bastion against the enemy's war of destruction. Every citizen and soldier in the border areas must be stalwart and resolute, and not allow any strength, plot, and devious trick to shake them.

The enemy -- the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists -- are seeking all ways to weaken us in order to annex our country and all three countries of Indochina. It is necessary to master the units, hamlets, and villages with regard to politics, economics, and national defense in order to attack the enemy in all aspects of their sabotage. And vice versa, only by attacking resolutely, continuously, and on all fronts is it possible to maintain their mastership right. Therefore, achieving mastery and attacking, and attacking and achieving mastery, are two closely related aspects on the front of opposing the war of destruction. Not allowing the enemy to occupy a single inch of our land, not allowing an opening through which the enemy can sneak in, and not failing to expose and defeat any enemy scheme and plot are tasks which the soldiers and people of the ethnic groups in Military Region 2 must continue to carry out with even greater effectiveness.

Firmly grasping the thoughts of mastership and offensive, the ethnic minority people have arisen to resolutely defeat the enemy's many-sided war of destruction. The more than 20,000 people's security teams that have been

organized in Hoang Lien Son and deployed all over the province are now hard-core forces in the localities and contribute positively to effectively attacking and retaliating against all plots and schemes of the war of destruction waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in the province. The security teams have played an important role in capturing infiltrated Chinese spies, capturing reactionaries attempting to cross the border, and suppressing people who spread false rumors and psywar propaganda.

Many localities have used such markets as the Bac Ha and Muong Khuong markets (Hoang Lien Son) and the Quan Ba market (Ha Tuyen), where many local people are concentrated, as strong points for attacking the enemy on the cultural-ideological front. A plan to "close off" the defense line and eliminate the "white" cultural bases in the border areas has been implemented. Many army units have contributed importantly to the movement to create a cultural zone along the border. Border Defense post 312 in Lai Chau and the Ma Sum border defense post in Hoang Lien Son have been exemplary in that movement.

Most of the people on the other side of the border opposite Military Region 2 are also ethnic minority people who have clan and family ties to the ethnic minority people on our side of the border. They are being suppressed in the communes and are subjected to the cruel assimilation policy and ethnic discrimination of the Chinese rulers. Most of the enemy armed forces which confront Military Region 2 on a daily basis are militia, local troops, and border defense troops. Although they have been indoctrinated with reactionary thoughts and exposed to distorted propaganda, most of the enemy troops are workers who bear no enmity toward the Vietnamese people. They and their families have more or less been victims, direct or indirect, of the purges and liquidations among the ruling factions. They desire peace and to be left alone to make a living, and fear being forced to cross over into Vietnam and serve as cannonfodder for their expansionist commanders. The soldiers and people in our border area are entirely capable of propagandizing and affecting them to enable them to clearly realize the reactionary, traitorous nature of the Chinese ruling clique and the just revolutionary cause of the Vietnamese people. Attacking the enemy politically is a mission of strategic importance, not only in order to defeat the enemy's sabotage plots and schemes but also to make a real contribution to the revolutionary cause of the Chinese people. That is a political responsibility of both the soldiers and the people in the border areas of Military Region 2. It is a very important aspect of the struggle against the enemy's war of destruction.

The armed forces of the military region are hard-core forces which, along with the ethnic minority people, strongly defend the border and the northwestern part of the homeland. The foremost mission of the armed forces is to smash all land-grabbing and infiltration schemes, while at the same time being prepared in all respects to defeat the enemy's war of aggression, no matter what the scale.

Land-grabbing is an act of armed aggression on the part of the enemy and at the same time is part of their over-all strategy of a many-sided war of destruction. We must smash all of their land-grabbing activities. That is an important daily military mission of the armed forces along the border. But

opposing land-grabbing is only one aspect of the over-all mission of opposing the enemy's war of destruction. The armed forces, which have the missions of fighting and being prepared to fight to defend the border, must also participate positively in the struggle against the war of destruction in the Military Region and be worthy of being forces which effectively support the people in that struggle. It is also necessary to realize that that is a political mission of the armed forces of the military region. Furthermore, the more they stop and smash enemy's sabotage plots and schemes of the enemy the more the armed forces have favorable conditions and a solid basis on which to victoriously fulfill the combat and combat readiness missions and to build forces and strengthen the defense of the border and the locality.

The people's armed forces in the military region include main-force troops, local troops of the province and the districts, militia and self-defense forces of the villages, enterprises, state farms, state forests, construction sites, etc., and the border defense troops. They are large forces which have political consciousness, tight organization, and strict military discipline. During the past several years those forces have clearly manifested determination to fight to defend the nation and the people, "regard the unit as their family, the border as their home area, and the ethnic minority people as their brothers," and have the all-out respect and love of the ethnic minority people. Therefore, a major mission of the armed forces in the military region is to develop their role, contribute importantly to propaganda, education, and enabling the local people to clearly realize the nature of the enemy and their plots and schemes, distinguish clearly between ourselves and the enemy, and not be vague or under any illusions, in order to heighten their vigilance and resolutely defeat the many-sided war of destruction waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. It must be realized that that is a very meticulous, permanent task. The enemy's plots are very insidious and their schemes are very devilish. If we are not resolute and persistent, and there are not many rich forms, the quality of propaganda and education cannot be high.

In the propaganda work it is necessary to pay special attention to teaching tradition and emphasize the tradition of ethnic solidarity against foreign aggression in the past and the revolutionary tradition of the ethnic minority people in the period of uprising to win political power in the anti-French and anti-U.S. resistance wars. The propaganda-education work is intended to bring about a true transformation with regard to political consciousness and thought, and must be manifested in daily attitudes and acts toward the sabotage plots and schemes of the enemy and the specific revolutionary missions in each locality. Each cadre and enlisted man must be a propaganda cadre who contributes, along with the local leadership and governmental organs, to occupying and mastering the political-ideological battlefield and smashing all psywar arguments of the enemy.

In addition to contributing positively to strengthening the battlefield position of local people's war, the armed forces of the military region must, along with the security forces, contribute to building comprehensively strong bases. Without strong bases and a strong battlefield position, especially in the border areas in the mountain region, which directly come to grips with the

enemy, the building of strong bases is an urgent requirement. Effort must be made to build combat hamlets and villages with strong party organizations, armed organizations, and mass organizations. Each base must have fighting methods that are appropriate to the local terrain, forces, and capabilities, with close coordination in an integrated battlefield deployment of clusters and districts in accordance with a unified plan. In building strong bases in the border areas it is necessary to pay special attention to building political bases. The army units must everywhere be strong supporting forces for those localities, strictly observe the regulations regarding the maintenance of political security and social order and safety in border areas, and do a good job of fulfilling plans to purify the border areas, internally purify the organizations, and eliminate the seeds of rebellion.

The enemy regard the destruction of ethnic solidarity and military-civilian solidarity as the number-one requirement in their war of destruction in the military region.

The armed forces of the military region must firmly grasp and fully implement the Party's correct ethnic policy. That is a key matter in consolidating military-civilian solidarity and enabling the soldiers and people to share a common will. That also is a basic content of the army's civilian proselytizing and political tasks among the ethnic minority people.

The Party's ethnic policy is one of the strategic missions of the Vietnamese revolution. The correct ethnic policy of the Party will strengthen the unshakeable solidarity bloc of the ethnic minority groups throughout the nation, and develop the revolutionary spirit and creativity of the ethnic minority peoples in the enterprise of defending the socialist Vietnamese homeland. The Party's ethnic policy is to fully implement equal rights in all regards among the ethnic groups and create the necessary conditions for eliminating at the roots the disparity in cultural and economic levels between the minority groups and the majority group, to enable all ethnic groups to have well-off, civilized and happy lives, and unite to help one another advance together to mastering the nation.

In order to fulfill that strategic mission the military region has prepared educational materials regarding the ethnic policy and the agreements regarding military-civilian relations in the areas where troops are stationed, and the contents of the "Military units share a common will with the people" campaign so that the units can study and register to struggle. Many units have set a good example with regard to military-civilian relations and strict mass discipline, and have the love and respect of the local party organizations, governmental administrations, and people. All of the units in the military region have registered to struggle to build "Military-civilian common will units," and 254 units from the division level down to the basic level have organized alliances with the local governmental administrations, mass organizations, schools, production units, and youths. Meetings between divisions and districts, regiments and villages, etc., to exchange experiences and carry out self-criticism and criticism regarding the implementation of the ethnic policy and military-civilian solidarity became a regular practice. The holding of annual "military-civilian solidarity conferences" at the provincial

and military region levels have also brought about many useful, practical results in promoting the implementation of the Party's ethnic policy.

In order to implement the Party's ethnic policy, a matter of foremost importance with regard to the armed forces is maintaining strict military discipline and mass discipline, and going all-out to respect the decisions of the local governmental administration and the customs and traditions of the ethnic minority people. The units stationed in all localities must truly participate in helping the people improve their spiritual-cultural lives and help the people overcome difficulties in organizing living conditions and production. Toward the enemy, they must fight stubbornly and be prepared to shed blood and sacrifice to defend the people; toward the people they must "love the people when living with them and remember the people when apart from them"; and toward all stands and policies of the Party and state, they must be exemplary in carrying them out, always maintain and develop the fine nature and traditions, and be worthy of the glorious title "Troops of Uncle Ho." That is a course of action which the armed forces of the miliary region are implementing in order to develop to a high degree their role in strengthening ethnic solidarity and military-civilian solidarity.

The plot of the Chinese expansionist, hegemonic clique to annex our country will never change. Their many-sided war of destruction against our nation and Military Region 2 is becoming increasingly fierce. The cadres and men of Military Region 2, armed forces on the front line of the homeland, in a key area of the enemy's many-sided war of destruction, must be extremely vigilant, closely monitor the enemy troops in all spheres, and be determined to, along with the people of the ethnic minority groups, smash their war of destruction, while being prepared to smash, from the very first battle and on the front line a war of aggression, no matter what its scale, should the enemy foolhardily start one against our country, in order to strongly defend the border and the northwestern part of the homeland.

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PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

NEW COURSE TAUGHT IN PARTY SCHOOLS DESCRIBED

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[Article by Nguyen Dinh Kham, head of the Party Section of the Department of Propaganda and Training of the Central Committee: "Teaching and Studying the State, Law and State Management Course in the Party School System"]

[Text] I. The Objectives, Requirements and Curriculum of the "State, Law and State Management" Course in the Party School System

1. Since it was founded our Party has confirmed that the matter of the state governmental administration is a basic matter of the revolution. The Political Program of 1930 affirmed that "It is necessary to set up a worker-peasant Soviet governmental administration. Only a Soviet governmental administration is sufficiently strong to overthrow the imperialists, feudalists, and landlords, enable the farmers to have land to plow, and enable the proletariat to have laws to protect their rights."(1)

Today, when the governmental administration has been set up all over the nation, the consolidation and strengthening of the socialist state is one of the Party's foremost missions. Our Party exercises its leadership of the revolution primarily by means of the state. The people also exercise their collective mastership right primarily by means of the state, under the leadership of the Party. The Fourth Party Congress observed that "The leadership of the Party and the collective mastership right of the people are manifested in a concentrated manner in the state and are exercised primarily by the activities of the state....The strengthening of the role and managerial effectiveness of the state is the most important sign of the Party's organizational level and ability."(2)

Our party also emphasizes that "The party compels all of its organizations, cadres, and members to obey the authority of the state organs, strictly enforce the laws, decisions, and directives of the state organs, and regard that as a matter of Party discipline."(3)

But at present there exists the situation of "the effectiveness of the state apparatus at all levels not yet being high," and "the socialist legal system has been slow to be strengthened, law and discipline have been relaxed, and the struggle against law violations and social evils has not been resolute and absolute," important reasons for which are that "There are still party

committee echelons and leadership cadres who have failed to fully understand that consolidating and strengthening the socialist state is a foremost mission of the Party, and there are still some Party organizations which do the state organs' work for them."(4)

In order to develop the role and effectiveness of the state, the decisive condition is strengthening the Party's leadership of the state and improving the party committee echelons' methods of leading the governmental administration. If that is to be accomplished, an extremely important condition is that the key cadres in the party and state apparatus must be allowed to study and research in order to systematically grasp knowledge regarding the state, laws, and state management. That is a very urgent requirement of the party leadership and the party school system.

Therefore, Decision 15-QD/TW of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee regarding the party schools pointed out that the Party's curricula for the elementary and advanced training of party leadership cadres must include knowledge of state management. The party cadres who are directly engaged in governmental administration work must of course fully understand and fully grasp basic knowledge regarding the state, law, and state management by means of the system of training state management cadres. At the same time, all party leadership cadres at all levels, even if they are not engaged directly in state work, must have a certain amount of necessary knowledge about the state, law, and state management in order to improve and raise the quality of the Party's leadership of the state.

2. The inclusion of a new subject in a curriculum requires preparation in many regards, especially with regard to study materials and instructors to teach that subject. At present, we must urgently begin the drafting of a new curriculum and textbook and actively prepare a corps of instructors, while also urgently examining the urgent requirements of study and calculating the specific conditions necessary for instruction and study. The Department of Propaganda and Training decided that in the immediate future it was necessary to add the "State, Law, and State Management" subject to the training curricula in the party school system. In 1983 Nguyen Ai Quoc School I and Central Propaganda-Training School I began to teach and study that subject. Although the curriculum for the new subject had only begun to be drafted, there was still a shortage of study materials, and the instructors had not yet been intensively trained, had not undergone much preparation, and were teaching the subject for the first time, the study brought about relatively good results and the students affirmed the necessity of the subject.

3. In the different classes the study had to be based on different curricula with different requirements, contents, and times. But the common requirements of that subject in the classes were:

- a. Grasping at the necessary level, according to each category in the classes, the following matters:
 - The basic viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism regarding the state and law.

-- Basic matters regarding the structure and organization of the state apparatus.

-- The state management principles and the mechanism of state management activities.

-- Our nation's laws (the principal contents of is constitution and a number of laws currently in effect).

b. Grasping the position, functions, missions, authority, and basic problems of management at their governmental echelon.

c. On the basis of those matters, increasing consciousness of the importance of strengthening of the socialist state, clearly realizing that that is a foremost mission of the Party and is related to social reality, especially the realities of their localities and bases and of their own work, recommend thoughts regarding the improvement of the methods of the Party's leadership of the state, and improve state management.

5. Two relatively systematic curricula in that subject are the curricula of the training classes of the Nguyen Ai Quoc schools and the curriculum of the provincial and municipal party schools. We will below introduce those two curricula:

In the training classes of the regional Nguyen Ai Quoc schools the course lasts 50 days and in the provincial and municipal training classes it lasts 20 days. The structure of the course includes the following principal parts:

Part 1: Basic matters regarding the state and socialist law.

In the curriculum of the regional Nguyen Ai Quoc schools, this part consists of five lessons:

1. The basic matters of Marxist-Leninist theory regarding the state. The state of the socialist Republic of Vietnam.
2. The basic matters of Marxist-Leninist theory regarding law. Strengthening the socialist legal system.
3. The principles and forms of socialist law.
4. The constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
5. The legal system and a number of laws now in effect in our country.

In the curriculum of the provincial and municipal party schools there are two lessons which correspond to that part:

1. Some basic matters of Marxist-Leninist theory concerning the state. The state of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

2. Some basic matters of Marxist-Leninist theory regarding law. Our country's laws. Strengthening the socialist legal system.

Part 2: Basic matters regarding the management of the socialist state.

The training curriculum of the regional Nguyen Ai Quoc schools includes the following six lessons:

1. Some general matters regarding the management of the socialist state.
2. The functions and principles of the management of the socialist state.
3. The organizational structure of the management apparatus of the socialist state.
4. The mechanism of management activities of the socialist state.
5. Building and cultivating the corps of management cadres of the socialist state.
6. The standards for evaluating the effectiveness of, and measures for perfecting, the management of the socialist state.

In the training curricula of the provincial and municipal party schools there are two lessons which correspond to this part:

1. Some basic matters regarding the management of the socialist state.
2. Standards for evaluating the effectiveness of, and measures for perfecting, the management of the socialist state.

Part 3: The governmental administrations at the district and village levels.

In the training curriculum of the regional Nguyen Ai Quoc schools, this part consists of 10 lessons:

With regard to developing the district echelon and organizing the activities of the governmental administrations at the district and village levels, it includes the following lessons:

1. The development of the district echelon and the role and functions of the district-level governmental administration.
2. The position, nature, functions, missions, authority, and working methods of the district people's councils.
3. The position, nature, functions, missions, authority, organizational apparatus, and working methods of the district people's committees.
4. The position, nature, functions, missions, authority, organizational apparatus, and working methods of the village-level governmental

administrations. The relationship between the governmental administrations at the district and village levels.

With regard to the management of the governmental administration at the district level, there are the following lessons:

5. Management of the education and scientific-technical tasks.
6. Management of the cultural-artistic activities.
7. Management of mass information activities.
8. Management of the public health, sports and physical education, and other social tasks.
9. National defense.
10. Political security and social order and safety.

In the training curricula of the provincial and municipal party schools there are three lessons which correspond to this part:

In the training curricula of the provincial and municipal party schools there are three lessons which correspond to this part:

1. The position, nature, functions, missions, authority, and operational mode of the village people's councils.
2. The position, nature, functions, missions, authority, organizational apparatus, and working methods of the village people's committees. The relationships between the village-level governmental administration and the district-level governmental administration.
3. The management tasks of the village-level governmental administrations.

In addition to those principal parts, there is a part regarding study of state administration.

There are two lessons in the training curriculum of the regional Nguyen Ai Quoc schools:

1. Documents and the management of documents.
2. Office organization and management.

The training curricula of the provincial and municipal party schools includes the lesson "Some Matters Regarding State Administration."

II. Some Matters That Must Receive Attention in the Contents of the "State, Laws, and State Management" Course in the Party Schools

1. The first matter that must be firmly grasped is the basic viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism regarding the state and laws, especially the socialist state and laws. Only on that basis is it possible to understand all other matters regarding the state, laws, and state management. Therefore, although in many places the Marxist-Leninist theory course deals with that matter it is still necessary to firmly grasp it and enter into it a little more deeply, not only because of its importance but also because, as Lenin emphasized, the state is one of the most complicated, difficult matters.

2. Furthermore, even in the first lessons it is necessary to set aside much time for our state and laws. With regard to our state, it is necessary to clarify the nature and functions of the state and the position of the state in the proletarian dictatorship system, and also pay attention to the organization of the state apparatus.

When studying the nature of our state it is necessary to concentrate on clarifying our Party's viewpoint that "when examined from the point of view of the regime, i.e. who masters society, the nature of the proletarian dictatorship is the same as collective mastership."(5)

With regard to the functions of our state, they should not be limited to the two basic functions of the proletarian dictatorship, organizing implementation and suppressing and protecting, but must enter deeply into the more specific functions. Internally, the socialist state has the following functions: organizing implementation and continually developing the people's mastership right in all regards; organizing and managing economic management; organizing and managing culture and education; and maintaining social order and security and suppressing elements which oppose socialism. Externally, the socialist state has the following functions: consolidating national defense and defending the socialist homeland; mutual assistance and cooperation among the nations of the socialist community; supporting the national liberation movement and cooperating with the developing nations; and struggling for peace and peaceful coexistence among nations with different social systems. It is necessary to fully understand those functions, but also pay attention to deeply studying the economic organization and management function.

With regard to the position of the state in the proletarian dictatorship system, it is necessary to make clear that the Party's leadership and the collective mastership right of the people are manifested in a concentrated manner in the state and is exercised primarily by means of the activities of the state.

The mechanism of the Party leading, the people serving as the masters, and the state managing must be manifested clearly in the state organizational apparatus. The people exercise their mastership right above all by means of the state organs of authority: the National Assembly and the people's councils at all levels. At present, the important matter is to endeavor to enable the state organs of authority to truly develop their roles and operate in correct accordance with their positions as organs of state authority. At present a number of organs of authority operate in form only and do not yet operate in accordance with the functions, missions, and authority stipulated by the

Constitution. That is a weakness in the activities of the state apparatus and is also a deficiency in the Party's leadership.

The system of management organs is a system of organs with the mission of managing political, economic, cultural, social, national defense, security, and other activities. It is a system of organs that is directly related to the daily life of the people. Strengthening those organs is now an urgent mission.

The organs of authority, the management and judicial organs, the control organs, and the people's armed forces are closely related to one another and combine to form a unified state and a unified system which ensures the combination of law-making with management, inspection, and control, and the elimination of bourgeois separation of powers among the legislative, administrative, and judicial branches.

3. The state and laws are always bound together. The state manages society by means of laws. Attention must be paid to explaining that strengthening the socialist legal system is an urgent requirement in increasing the effectiveness of state management and ensuring the collective mastership right of the working people.

Attention must be paid to explaining that our socialist law "is the line and policy of the Party and also the benefit and will of the people manifested in the form of the state."(6) With regard to the Party, laws are means for guiding the activities of society. With regard to the workers, laws are means for exercising collective mastership, and with regard to the state laws are means of exercising management.

On the part of the party leadership cadres, creating consciousness of laws is at present a very important requirement. The political report of the Fifth Party Congress emphasized that "The party committees, cadres, and party members must be exemplary in implementing the Constitution and laws, and take the lead in the struggle to strengthen the socialist legal system. The party organizations are strictly forbidden to make stipulations contrary to law."(7)

Strengthening the socialist legal system requires the simultaneous carrying out of three tasks. The first is building an increasingly complete legal system. At present, it is necessary to urgently concretize the new Constitution by means of a system of laws and pay attention to gradually creating a system of economic laws and laws regarding the security of society. The second is organizing law enforcement. It is necessary to widely and deeply propagandize and disseminate the laws among the cadres and people, introduce legal studies into the schools at all levels, and build and cultivate consciousness of socialist laws and consciousness of living with laws and respecting the law. It is necessary to continually oversee the implementation of laws by the use of many forms: oversight by the National Assembly and the Council of State, control by the upper-echelon state organs over the lower-echelon organs, control by the State Inspection commission, inspection by the sectors, and control by the Supreme People's Organ of Control. Third, dealing strictly and promptly with all violations of law and ensuring that there is an appropriate form for dealing with every law violation.

Building consciousness of laws cannot be separated from grasping laws and obeying them. If laws are not understood they cannot be obeyed. And if laws are not understood and obeyed it is impossible to operate in accordance with the party leading, the people serving as the masters, and the state managing, and it is impossible to ensure the leadership of the party and the collective mastership right of the people. Because of time limitations in the curricula an all-out effort must be made to teach such necessary concepts regarding laws as the violation of laws, the legal sector, legal documents, etc., and the principal contents of a number of our country's current laws, especially the Constitution and the administrative, economic, labor, criminal, and other laws. Because of the time limitations, such basic knowledge of laws cannot enable the students to have relatively complete knowledge of law, especially of specific laws. Therefore, the study of law in those curricula has the important responsibility of building a basis for further study of law in the course of their future work.

4. With regard to the management of the socialist state, it must be realized that that is still a new subject with regard to theory and is very important to us, for the role of management in social development had increased steadily, especially in the socialist system. In the social management system the role of state management occupies a special position. The especially important role of state management is above all determined by the nature of the state. The socialist state is the sharpest tool, the principal tool, of the working class and the laboring people in building and defending the socialist homeland. The important role of state management is also due to its following special characteristics: the state is the only social organization that brings together all people in the nation; the state has authority; the socialist state has the leadership right with regard to society as a whole and is the largest owner of the means of production; and the socialist state ensures the exercise of the collective mastership right of the laboring people.

It is necessary to firmly grasp an outstanding characteristic of state management: management by law.

The subjective and objective aspects of state management are matters which must be determined clearly if there is to be a basis for studying the other aspects of state management scientifically. It is necessary distinguish between the subject of social authority -- all laboring people -- and the subject of state management with regard to law, the socialist state. To do so is to confirm that the people serve as the masters and the state manages.

5. With regard to the functions of state management it is necessary to distinguish between the functions of the state and the functions of state management (the organization function, the cadre function, the planning function, the control function, etc.). Each state function is exercised by means of the state management functions. It is necessary to distinguish between the functions of the state management system and the managerial activities of the state organs; distinguish between the general functions and the special functions of state management; and distinguish between the external functions and internal functions of state management. Those are matters of real significance with regard to state management.

The management principles of the socialist state are the most basic, most important objective relationships of a law-like nature in the management activities of the socialist state. Those principles play a very great role in actual state management. They are both matters of theory and actual rules in the state management activities.

It is necessary to deal with the system of state management principles, which includes three groups of principles: the group of social-political principles, a group of organizational principles, and a group of principles regarding management activities. It is not possible to examine all of the principles; instead, it is necessary to enter deeply into a number of principles, such as the principle of democratic centralism, the principles of the socialist legal system, the principle of organization according to territory and sector, the principle of combining collectivism and individual responsibility, information principles, etc.

6. With regard to the organizational structure of state management, it is necessary to realize that that organizational structure is not a subdivision of the state apparatus, and is not merely a system of management organs (the executive-management organs) or simply the sum of all state organs. The organs representing authority, the court and control organs, can participate in state management, but state management is not the principal activity of those organs. The organizational structure of state management includes the organs of authority and the management (executive-management), court, and control organs. The problem here is to determine the position and role of each kind of organ in the sphere of state management activities.

Attention must be paid to matters related to the organizational structures of the state organs, especially the special characteristics of those organizational structure, because they are matters of practical significance.

7. With regard to the state management activities it is necessary to pay attention to analyzing the phases of the management process:

- Analyzing and evaluating the management situation.
- Foreseeing and modeling the management operations.
- Drafting, discussing and approving legal documents regarding the organizational modes.
- Organizing the implementation of resolutions that have been approved.
- Reviewing implementation, recapitulating and evaluating tasks that have been performed and estimating the new management situation.

It is necessary to pay attention to analyzing the state management methods, such as education and persuasion methods, economic methods, and administrative methods.

8. The development and cultivation of the corps of state management cadres are very important aspects of leadership and management. Attention must be paid to analyzing the requirements of management cadres in the new revolutionary phase, and to specifically analyzing the standards regarding political quality, the level of understanding, and work ability.

Matters regarding the selection, training, and assigning cadres must be studied carefully and combined closely with the drafting of cadre plans and plans to train cadres.

9. The standards for evaluating the effectiveness of state management are a very important, very complicated matter. At present, the theory of state management divides state management effectiveness into three different levels and delineates the standards for evaluating effectiveness at each of those levels. Those three levels are: general social effectiveness; special social effectiveness; and the specific social effectiveness of each state employee. Studying that matter helps us think about the method of evaluating the effectiveness of our state's management.

On the basis of evaluating the effectiveness of state management it is necessary to carefully study the measures for perfecting state management that were delineated in the political report and report on party building of the Fifth Party Congress.

10. After studying the basic matters regarding the state, laws, and state management, each student will study matters related to the organization and management of the governmental administration at his level. This part focusses on study of party and state documents regarding the development of the party echelon and strengthening the governmental administration at the district echelon, the strengthening of the village-level governmental administration, the laws regarding the organization of the people's councils and people's committees at all levels, reports of the governmental administrations of some districts and villages with good management, and the exchange of experiences regarding state management

11. The party's leadership of the state is the decisive element in strengthening the state's management role and effectiveness. That matter will be studied in a concentrated manner in the party building course. But throughout the process of studying about the state, law, and state management it is necessary to continually think about improving the party's method of leading the state and the way to overcome the situation of confusing the work of the party committee echelons and the state organs.

III. Some Points Regarding the Guidelines and Methods of Studying the Subject "The State, Laws, and State Management" That Must Receive Attention

As is true with regard to the other subjects, in studying the subject "The State, Law, and State Management" it is necessary to do a good job of relating theory to practice in creating a scientific, independent, creative way of thought. With regard to that subject, it is necessary to pay attention to the following points:

1. The subject itself is the application of Marxist-Leninist theory to a basic concern of the revolution. Therefore, the study of that subject tests the assimilation of Marxist-Leninist theory, and is at the same time study of the application of Marxist-Leninist theory to the actual situation.

Many theories and views of Marxism-Leninism are applied to the study of the state and law. Many lessons in the basic theoretical subjects of Marxism-Leninism, especially historical materialism and scientific communism, have directly dealt with the basic Marxist-Leninist theory regarding the state and law. It is necessary to do a good job of applying the viewpoints and knowledge that have been studied to the new subject. Furthermore, by studying theory of the state, law, and state management it is necessary to grasp more firmly and understand more profoundly the theories of Marxism-Leninism.

2. This subject is a theoretical subject regarding the organization of implementation and deals with many matters regarding the organization of implementation that is related to the actual situation. One should not, for that reason, fail to understand that in studying theory it is necessary to grasp the conclusions, principles, and methods that have been formulated and generalized in the actual situation, and are not limited to the listing of specific matters. Only thereby is it possible to create methods for learning and working, increase initiative and creativity, and overcome the disease of pragmatism. Furthermore because that is theory regarding the organization of implementation, when studying it is necessary to think and relate closely to specific matters in state management activities, in the enforcement of laws, and in the Party's leadership of the state, and must be related to the knowledge and work of the students in such matters.

3. A very important matter regarding study methods is that in the process of study and especially in the last phase of the course thoughts and opinions must be contributed toward improving the methods of state management activities at all echelons, and toward improving the Party's leadership methods with regard to the state. Those thoughts are a yardstick for measuring, and manifest, the initial results of study.

During the recent period, study of the "State, Law, and State Management" course has been initiated in a number of classrooms and has achieved initial results. It is difficult to avoid difficulties, deficiencies, and limitations in studying a new course. We will overcome those difficulties, gain experience regarding the contents, methods, and organization of the teaching and study of that course, and advance to having instructional materials and a corps of specialized teachers which correspond to the importance of the course, thus contributing practically to improving the quality and effectiveness of training the corps of state management cadres and party leadership cadres.

FOOTNOTES

1. "History of the Vietnam Communist Party: Excerpts From Party Documents." Marx-Lenin Publishing House, Hanoi, 1979, Vol I, p 40.

2. "Political Report at the Fourth Party Congress," pp 148-149.
3. Op. cit., p. 149
4. "Documents of the Fifth Party Congress," Vol. 1, p 117.
5. Speech by comrade Le Duan at the Fifth Plenum of VCP Central Committee (Fifth Session).
6. Le Duan, "Some Problems Regarding Organization and Cadres in the Socialist Revolution." Su That Publishing House, 1973, p 50.
7. "Documents of the Fifth Party Congress." Vol I, p 117.

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PARTY SCHOOL CURRICULUM FOR BASIC-LEVEL KEY CADRES

Hanoi GIAO DUC LY LUAN in Vietnamese No 1, Jan-Feb 84, pp 31-39

[One-Year Program for Basic-Level Key Cadres at Provincial, Municipality, and Special Zone Party Schools, 1983-1985 Academic Years]

[Text]	Subject	Time		
		Total Hours	Lecture Periods	Discussion Periods
	Marxist-Leninist Philosophy	26		
Lessons:				
--Objects of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy.	1	4	2	
--Materialism: Materialism and Consciousness.	3	8	6	
--Basic Laws of Dialectical Materialism.	3	8	8	
--Some Basic Categorical Pairs of Dialectical Materialism.	2	6	4	
--Theory of Knowledge of Dialectical Materialism.	2	6	4	
--Economic-Social Forms.	3	8	8	
--Classes and Class Struggle, Social Revolution and the State.	3	8	8	
--Roles of the Popular Masses and Individuals in History.	1.5	4	4	
--Social Consciousness and the Forms of Social Consciousness.	2.5	8	6	
Discussion:				

--Dialectical materialism is the theoretical philosophical basis of the lines and policies of the Party and is a sharp weapon in the ideological struggle between socialism and imperialism (after Lesson 5).	1		
Subject Review and Examination (School determines topics and form)	3		3
Marxist-Leninist Political Economy	58		
Capitalism:	(23)		
Lessons:			
--Objects of Marxist-Leninist Political Economy.	1	4	2
--Commodity Production and the Appearance of Capitalism.	3	8	8
--Capitalism and Surplus Value. Salaries Under the Capitalist System.	2.5	8	4
--Three developmental phases of capitalism in industry.	1.5	4	4
--Capital Accumulation and the Povertyization of the Proletarian Class.	1.5	4	4
----Capital Circulation and Cycles.			
--Capitalist Profit, Income, and Land Rent.	2	6	6
--Capitalist Social Reproduction and Economic Crisis.	3	8	8
--Imperialism, the General Crisis of Capitalism.	3	8	8
Specialized Reports:			
--Capitalist State Monopoly.	1		
--Neocolonialism:	1		
Discussion: Marx's analysis of surplus value, the significance of that theory in understanding the nature and forms of capitalist exploitation and the motivation of the proletarian class to overthrow capitalism and build socialism.	1		

Review and examination regarding capitalism (the school determines the topics and form).	2.5			
Socialism:	(35)			
--The period of transition from capitalism to socialism.	2	6	4	
--Transformation of the old production relations and construction of the new socialist relations.	2	6	4	
--Construction of the material-technical bases of socialism. Socialist industrialization.	3	8	8	
--The system of socialist economic laws. Basic economic laws of socialism.	2	6	4	
--The law of planned, balanced development of the national economy.	3	8	8	
--Law of the constant increasing of labor productivity.	2	6	4	
--Law of distribution according to labor.	2	6	4	
--Commodity production. The law of value in socialist society.	2	6	4	
--Commerce in the socialist system.	2	6	4	
--Finance, credit, currency, and banking in the socialist system.	2	6	4	
--Economic accounting.	1.5	4	4	
--Socialist reproduction.	2	6	4	
--The forms and methods of applying the economic laws in socialist economic management.	2	4	4	
--The world socialist economic system.	1	4	2	
Guided reading:				
--Economics and politics in the period of the proletarian dictatorship (Lenin, "Collected Works," Vol 36, pp 309-321).				

--Present missions of the Soviet regime
(Lenin, "Collected Works," Vol 36, pp
201-256.

Discussion: (One of two topics may be selected).

--The objective bases of an economy which still has many components in the period of transition to socialism. The significance of that matter toward socialist transformation and the construction of socialism in the initial phase of the period of transition to socialism. 1

--Significance of planned economic leadership and the conscious application of commodity-monetary relations. 1

Final review and examination (the school selects the topics and form).

Communism:	26			
--Objects of scientific communism.	1	4	2	
--The world historical mission of the proletarian class.	2	6	4	
--The socialist revolution. The appearance and development of the communist economic-social form.	2	6	4	
--The present era and the course of the world revolution The three revolutionary currents.	2	6	4	
--The proletarian dictatorship.	2	6	4	
--The social structure in socialist society.	2	6	4	
--Socialist social management.	2	6	4	
--Socialism and the nationalities question.	1	4	2	
--Socialism and the religious question.	1	4	2	
--Socialism and the family.	1	4	2	

The International Workers' Movement and the National Liberation Movement

Lessons:

--Brief history of the international workers' movement and the national liberation movement.	2	8	4
--International proletarianism, an important principle of the international communist movement.	1	4	2
--The world socialist community.	1	4	2
--Alliance of the three Indochinese countries.	1	4	2
--The present struggle to defend world peace.	1	4	2

Guided reading:

- Marx and Engles, "The Communist Manifesto" (excerpt, read in Lesson 2).

Discussion:

--Application of the general laws of the socialist revolution to the specific conditions in our country.	1		
Final review and examination (the school selects the topics and form).	3		
History of the Vietnam Communist Party	15		
--Birth of the Vietnam Communist Party.	1.5	4	4
--The Party leads the struggle to win power August Revolution of 1945 (1930-1945).	1.5	6	2
--The Party leads the carrying out of the two revolutionary strategies: the socialist revolution in the north and the popular national democratic revolution in the south (1954-1975).	2.5	8	4

--The Party leads the enterprise of building and defending an independent, unified socialist Vietnamese homeland (1975 to the Fifth Party Congress). 1.5 4 4

--Major lessons of the history of the Vietnam Communist Party. 2.5 1 2

Specialized reports:

--The life and activities of President Ho Chi Minh.

--The local party historical sections and some comrades with many years' experience report on the history of local party organizations. 1

Discussion:

--Major lessons of party history (after Lesson 6). 2

Review and examination regarding history (school selects topics and form). 2

Some Basic Problems Regarding the Party Lines

Lessons:

--The two strategic missions and the struggle against the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists. 2 4 4

--Some problems regarding our Party's general line and line of socialist economic construction. The present phase -- the economic-social missions for the 1980's and the 1981-1985 5-year plan. 3 8 8

--Socialist industrialization and advancing a step further toward large-scale socialist production. 2 6 4

--Continually strengthening and perfecting the socialist production relations nationwide. Promoting the socialist transformation of private industry and commerce in the south. Adjusting the land, fulfilling the socialist transformation of agriculture in the south. 2 6 4

--Promoting the ideological-cultural revolution, building a new culture and the new socialist man.	1.5	6	6
--Perfecting the mechanism of the Party leading, the people serving as the masters, and the state managing.	2	4	4
--The world situation and the foreign policy of our Party and state.	1.5	8	8
--Resolutions of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Central Committee plenums.	3	8	8
--Discussion:			
--Some problems regarding the general line and the economic line that must receive special attention: grasping the dictatorship of the proletariat, building the system of collective mastership, and carrying out socialist industrialization, tied in with the knowledge and acts of the units, the localities, and the students.	1		
Review and examination regarding the Party's lines (the school selects the topics and forms).	2		
The State, Laws, and State Management	20		
Lessons:			
--Some basic problems of Marxist-Leninist theory with regard to the state. The state of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.	2	8	4
--Some basic problems of Marxist-Leninist theory regarding laws Our country's laws Strengthening the socialist legal system.	2	8	4
--Some basic problems regarding management of the socialist state (functions, principles, structure of the organizational structure; the operational mechanism, building and cultivating the corps of cadres).	3	10	6
--Standards for evaluating effectiveness and measures for perfecting socialist state management.	1.5	4	4

--The position, nature, functions, missions, authority, and operational mode of the village people's councils. 1.5 4 4

--The position, nature, functions, missions, authority, organizational apparatus, and working methods of the village people's committees, the relationship between the village-level governmental administration and the district-level governmental administration. 2 8 8

--Some matters regarding state management. 1.5 4 4

--Management tasks of the village-level governmental administrations (culture, society, national defense, security, etc.) 2 8 4

Specialized reports:

--Report by a village governmental administration with good management. 1

Exchange of experiences:

--On strengthening the socialist legal system and teaching citizens consciousness of laws. 1

Final review and examination (school selects topics and form). 2.5

Economic Management 40

A. Basic Problems of Scientific Management

Lessons:

--The nature and objectives of socialist economic management.

--The principles, functions, and methods of socialist economic management. 2 8 8

--The economic management mechanism and problems regarding the perfection of the present economic management mechanism. 2 8 8

B. Viewpoints and guidelines of the resolution of the Fifty Party Congress regarding the perfection of economic management.

--The decentralization of economic management.	1.5	4	4
--The renovation of planning.	2	6	6
--The three economic benefits in the enterprise of building socialism.	1.5	4	4
--Amending and drafting economic lever policies.	2	6	4
--Implementing socialist economic and commercial accounting.	2	6	4
--Some Party and state policies regarding the development of agricultural-industrial districts, the strengthening of cooperatives, encouraging the development of agricultural, small industry, and industrial development, distribution-circulation, etc	3	12	8

C. Organizing and managing agricultural cooperatives.

--The missions, principles, and management methods of agricultural cooperatives.	2	4	4
--The mechanism of contracting-out final output to groups of workers and individual workers.	2	4	4
--The production guidelines and scales of agricultural cooperatives. Production-financial plans in agricultural cooperatives.	2	6	4
--Organizing the production sectors in agricultural cooperatives.	2	8	4
--Organizing and using the basic elements of the production process in agricultural cooperatives.	2	8	4
--Financial management and accounting in agricultural cooperatives.	1.5	4	4

--Analyzing economic activities in agricultural cooperatives. If the students are leadership cadres of industrial enterprises, Part C will be as follows:

D. Organizing and managing state industrial enterprises.

Lessons:

--Socialist industrial enterprises and the production structure of industrial enterprises.	1.5	4	1
--Organizing the production process in industrial enterprises.	1.5	4	1
--Organizing the production apparatus of industrial enterprises.	1.5	4	1
--Planning of industrial enterprises.	1.5	4	4
--Technical management in industrial enterprises.	1.5	4	4
--Labor and salary management in industrial enterprises.	1.5	4	4
--Supply management and the use of production materials in industrial enterprises.	1.5	4	4
--Economic accounting in industrial enterprises.	1.5	4	4
--Analyzing economic activities in industrial enterprises.	1.5	4	4
--Actual reports:			
--Report by a local village (or enterprise) which does a good job of production, distribution-circulation, and market management, and which does a good job of contracting out output to groups and individual workers.	1		

Exchange of experiences:

--Economic management at the village level or the improvement of enterprise management and living conditions (may be divided into two parts).	2		
--Final review and examination (the school may select the topics and form):	4		
Party Building	26		
Lessons:			
--Marxist-Leninist theory on building the party of the working class. Principles of party organization and activity.	2.5	6	4
--The missions and guidelines of our party in the present phase of the revolution.	2	6	4
--The party's organizational system. Perfecting the party's basic-level organization.	2	6	4
--The party member work and the cadre work in the basic-level party organization.	2	6	4
--The control work in the basic-level party organization.	2	6	4
--The party's ideological work.	2	6	4
--The party leads economic-social development.	1.5	6	4
--The party leads the basic-level governmental organs.	1.5	4	4
--The party leads and mass work and the basic-level mass organizations.	2	6	4
--The missions and specific tasks of the key leadership comrades at the basic level (secretaries, chairmen, directors, etc.).	2.5	6	8

Reading:

--Ho Chi Minh, "Party Building" (guided reading of excerpts).

Actual reports:

--A basic-level party organization that has carried out party building tasks well:

1

Discussion:

--On the class nature and vanguard nature of the party in the new revolutionary phase.

.5

--The principal guidelines regarding party building. The application of those guidelines to building local party organizations.

Exchanging experiences:

--On improving the party's leadership ability at the basic level or on some specific party building task.

1

Review and final examination (the school selects the topics and form):

3

Supplementary information

12

Depending on the specific situation of the locality, and the students and capabilities of the school, supplementary reports are made on historical, geographical, scientific-technical, cultural, artistic, educational, psychological, and other topics. Those topics must be distributed throughout the academic year and efforts must be made to relate them to the lessons of the main subjects. For example, when studying philosophy a report is made on the origin of life; when studying scientific communism and the communist movement, a report is made on world history; when studying party history a report is made on the history of Vietnam; when studying political economy a report is made on geography, etc.

Time Distribution

The academic year of party schools begins on 5 September every year. If there is a summer break, the academic year ends in July of the following year. If there are seasonal breaks, the breaks must equal the summer break. The schools base their seasonal break times on their specific situations.

Division of Time	Time (Days)
A. General Division of Time	
1. Days in an academic year	365
2. Days off during an academic year	95

--Summer break, seasonal breaks, Tet	45
--1 January and 1 May	3
--Sundays	47
3. Scheduled work days (365-95)	279
4. Opening day, closing day, review and final examination	7
5. On-the-spot study	15
6. Reserve days	4
7. Actual study days (270-26)	244
B. Division of Time Among Subjects	
1. Marxist-Leninist Philosophy	26
2. Marxist-Leninist political economy	58
--Capitalism (23 days)	
--Socialism (35 days)	
3. Scientific Communism, the International Workers' Movement, the National Liberation Movement	26
4. History of the Vietnam Communist Party	16
5. Some Aspects of the Resolutions of the Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses	20
6. State Management	20
7. Economic Management	40
8. Party Building	26
9. Supplementary Information	12

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PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

DRAFT TRAINING PROGRAM FOR BASIC-LEVEL CADRES

Hanoi GIAO DUC LY LUAN in Vietnamese No 1, Jan-Feb 84 pp 40-43

[Draft Training Program for Party Chapter Secretaries and Basic-Level Party Committee Members in District and City Party Schools]

[Text] (Used in training classes for current party chapter secretaries and basic-level party committee members under 50 years of age who have not attended party schools and training classes for cadres who are to become party chapter secretaries and basic-level party committee members)

Time: 3.5 months.

Topic	Study Days	Lecture Periods	Discussion Periods
Part I -- Some Basic Matters of Marxism-Leninism	27		
Lessons:			
--Dialectical materialism.	3	12	4
--Historical materialism.	3	12	4
--Imperialism, the final phase of capitalism.	3	12	4
--The historic world mission of the proletarian class The proletarian revolution and the proletarian dictatorship.	2	6	4
--The communist economic-social form and the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.	2	6	4
--The basic economic laws of socialism.	1.5	4	4
--The law of planned, balanced economic development.	1.5	4	4

--The law of continually increasing labor productivity. The law of distribution according to labor.	1.5	4	4
--The commodity-monetary relations under socialism. Socialist commerce.	2	6	4
--Finance, credit, economic accounting.	2	6	4
--Socialist reproduction.	2	4	4
--Review.	2		
Part II -- Vietnam's Revolutionary Lines	16		
Lessons:			
--The two strategic missions and the struggle against the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists	1.5	4	4
--Some problems regarding our Party's general lines and its line of constructing a socialist economy.	2	8	4
--Socialist industrialization and advancing agriculture a step further toward large-scale socialist production.	1.5	4	4
--Continually strengthening and perfecting production relations throughout the nation. Promoting the socialist transformation of private industry and commerce in the south. Adjusting the land, completing the socialist transformation of agriculture in the south.	1.5	4	4
--Promoting the ideological-cultural revolution, building the new culture and the new socialist man.	1.5	4	4
--Perfecting the mechanism of the Party leading, the people serving as the masters, and the state managing.	1.5	4	4
--The world situation and the foreign policy of our Party and state. Continually consolidating and strengthening the basic relations and the combat alliance of the three Indochinese nations.	1.5	4	4

--Resolutions of the third, fourth, and fifth Central Committee plenums.	3	12	8
Review:	2		
Part III -- Some Problems Regarding the State and Laws		3 days	
Lessons:			
--Some basic theoretical problems regarding the state and laws.	1	4	
--Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.	2	8	4
--Some laws currently in effect in our country.	2	8	4
--The position, nature, missions, authority, and working methods of the village people's councils and people's committees.	2	8	4
Review:	1		
Part IV -- Some Basic Problems Regarding Economic Management		21 days	
Lessons:			
--The economic management mechanism and problems regarding the perfecting of the present economic management mechanism.	1.5	4	4
--The renovation of planning.	1.5	4	4
--The amendment and drafting of a number of a number of economic lever policies.	1.5	4	4
--On the three economic interests in building socialism.	1.5	4	4
--The production direction and scale of agricultural production cooperatives. Production-financial planning in cooperatives (Lesson 24).	2	6	4
--Organization of the production sectors in the agricultural production cooperatives.	1.5	4	4

--Organizing and using the basic factors of the production process in agricultural production cooperatives.	2	6	4
--The contracting-out mechanism and the policy of contracting out final output to groups and individual workers in agricultural production cooperatives.	1.5	4	4
--Financial management and accounting in agricultural production cooperatives.	1.5	4	4
--Analyzing economic activities in agricultural production cooperatives.	1.5	4	4
--Role, missions, and working methods of agricultural production cooperative management boards, of production unit leaders, and of production collective leaders.	2.5	8	8

Supplementary reports:

--Experiences in carrying out the contracting-out in a specific cooperative.	1
--Experiences in fulfilling responsibilities and missions of unit-level management elements.	1

For cadres at industrial installations, lessons after Lesson 29 are replaced by the following:

Lessons:

--Organizing and managing enterprises.	2	8	4
--Organizing and managing factory departments.	2	8	4
--Planning and accounting in factory departments.	2	8	4
--Role, missions, and working methods of cadres managing departments.	2	8	4

Review: 2

Part IV -- Some Problems Regarding
Party Building 14 days

Lessons:

--The Party and basic problems regarding party building.	2	8	4
--Missions and guidelines of party building.	2	8	4
--Organizational system of the Party. Basic-level party organizations.	2	8	4
--The party member work at the basic level.	2	6	4
--The proselytizing and educational tasks and concern for the living conditions of the bases at the basic level.	2	6	4
--Role and working methods of party chapter secretaries.	2	6	4

Review: 2

Distribution of Time:

Part I : 27 days.

Part II : 16 days.

Part III: 8 days.

Part IV : 24 days.

Part V : 14 days.

On-site visits : 3 days

Opening,
Closing,
Final
Review : 3 days.

Total : 95 days.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, NORTH/SOUTH ALIENATION CONTINUE

West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL in German 15 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Helmut Opletal: "North and South Remain Alienated. There Are Still Many Differences in Reunited Vietnam"]

[Text] Anyone who travels for the first time from spartan, sleepy Hanoi to Saigon, which has abundant supplies, but is marked by oppressive social contrasts, will at first experience culture shock. And he sometimes wonders why, that since 1975, this of all cities has been called Ho Chi Minh City after the Vietnamese revolutionary.

In what used to be the "Maxim" restaurant rich businessmen are served choice Vietnamese, Chinese and French dishes and also real cognac, the smartly dressed young people sit packed together in the cafes in order to listen to American pop music. Young Vietnamese on their imported motorcycles whisk through the city as if there were neither gasoline rationing nor a scarcity of foreign currency.

Only the smaller part of the three and one-half million inhabitants can afford these comforts. Yet in contrast to the north of Vietnam almost everything that the heart could desire is available here: cola, Dutch beer in cans, French cognac, Western cosmetics, Japanese stereo sets and even motorcycles are available on the market. Most of it was smuggled out of Thailand on ships or via land routes, and in this connection Vietnamese soldiers often took care of the transport through Cambodia. But whatever once gets there may also be sold, and the city gets part of the earnings by taxing the dealers. Every product is given an official price tag by the market authorities who hope in this way to get inflation under control.

There are 123 "official" black markets in Ho Chi Minh City. City spokesman Vu Hac Bong says by way of justifying the legalized smuggling that "that is simply the question of how we can maintain a normal everyday life." Even state agencies, as a functionary of Saigon television confesses, provide themselves on the black market with urgently needed equipment and replacement parts.

Even 9 years after the end of the war the economic planning functionaries from Hanoi have scarcely gotten a thorough grasp on the South Vietnamese

economy. After 1975 all larger enterprises were nationalized; only retail trade and smaller industrial enterprises remained partly or totally private. Almost all industrial enterprises were dependent on foreign raw material deliveries and replacement parts. When there were no longer foreign currencies for them they had to cut back their production on the average of 20 to 30 percent. Even today many machines lie idle.

Of course, Ho Chi Minh City now once again has a certain foreign trade autonomy which permits local enterprises even to use export proceeds, but in most economic questions the central bureaucracy 1,700 kilometers to the north in Hanoi has the final word. Frederic Benoliel, French representative of a large chemical group in Ho Chi Minh City, complains: "It often takes a year until a decision is made or, for example, for a foreign business partner to receive a visa."

As the only foreign company after 1975 his company was permitted to retain a 49-percent share in a production enterprise, primarily because it manufactures urgently needed drugs. Of course, some years ago the Vietnamese did enact an investment law for foreigners, yet so far no one has done any investing because of the almost insurmountable practical obstacles.

Living Off Capital

The French businessman says that "in South Vietnam's industry there is scarcely any new net product." Viewed in that manner even the rich array of goods in the markets is deceptive because it is living off capital: As long as the Vietnamese economy does not offer suitable export products, imports have to be paid for with gold, silver and antiques. In this connection it is the southern part of Vietnam that has the best natural conditions: rubber, cane sugar and tropical fruits thrive magnificently, products from the sea are present in excess, under the bottom of the sea off the coast there is petroleum which is now being developed with the help of hundreds of Soviet experts. And we must not overlook the fact that the war permanently disfigured not only the political and social systems, but also the economy. When in the sixties 600,000 Americans were in the country temporarily, everything was oriented to the dollar. And after the mass exodus of perhaps a million South Vietnamese after the war there is a lack today of many urgently needed economic experts and specialists.

The average standard of living in the south is still significantly higher than in the north, but the contrasts between rich and poor are also greater.

According to official statistics 50,000 homeless, many of them disabled veterans, still have to live on the streets. Dressed in rags, they are seen sleeping on bamboo mats along the edges of the streets, often in the vicinity of hospitals where they hope to be admitted and taken care of. It is claimed that there are far fewer than immediately after the war, yet the fact remains that people continue to vegetate on the streets, starve and die from diseases.

Elsewhere, too, the wounds which were inflicted by the war and its accompanying circumstances, are scarcely healed: prostitution and petty crimes. Corruption and drug abuse are also found in Ho Chi Minh City in 1984.

Drug Problems Continue

A count in 1975 showed a half million drug addicts in South Vietnam, at that time 2 tons of heroin flowed to Saigon every month, and the narcotics syndicates, in which even the Thieu regime and the CIA were involved, earned \$90 million a year, relates Nguyen Quang Van, director of a rehabilitation center in an eastern suburb, the heritage of this past.

Some of the predominantly young people come voluntarily, others are here at the urging of parents and friends. Many have also been committed to treatment by a court. Physical therapy with acupuncture, massages, physical exercises and doses of traditional herb medicines are supposed to alleviate the withdrawal symptoms. The director says: "In contrast to many Western detoxification centers where the drug dosage is reduced just one step at a time, in our case there are no drugs at all from the first day." After the physical detoxification which lasts between a week and a month, psychological follow-up treatment is started: the people remain in the facility for up to 1 year, after 6 months they are first permitted to go into society for a few hours, then for days at a time. In the rehabilitation center itself training facilities and school classes have been set up; anyone involved in joinery and tailoring even receives a regular salary from which he, of course, pays back to the state part of the costs of his stay in the facility. The failure rate among former drug addicts who have been released is said to be only 30 percent.

The solution to social problems rests with the creation of jobs. Former drug addicts, who when cured leave the rehabilitation center, are offered the opportunity to move to so-called new economic zones, to rural regions which lie fallow and which are to be developed economically; the same opportunity is also given to other unemployed people in the city and to the many hundreds of thousands who can scarcely live off their private retail business.

State Farms

"Nhi Xuan"--"Two Springs" is the name of one of these state farms which was developed 30 kilometers northwest of Saigon after the war--in an area which was opened to total bombardment by the American military in order to make it difficult for the Viet Cong to get near the Than Son Nhut airforce base. The first attempts after the war to cultivate the uninhabited land with rice farming were unsuccessful. In 1979 "volunteer work gangs" were finally sent here, a paramilitary unit to develop the land. They built irrigation facilities, dwellings of bamboo, put in paths and roads and created infrastructure and social facilities: schools, a kindergarten, a civic center and a medical station. It has only been since 1981 that the state farm has been able to sustain itself with sugar cane and pineapple crops. Incense sticks, sugar, alcohol and paper mache are produced in small workshops.

The state has invested 19 million dong (DM3 million) in Nhi Xuan, and for that reason this state farm also contrasts positively from many other "new economic zones." For as a rule the government supplies the new arrivals with foodstuffs for only 1/2 year; then they have to feed themselves, and that is possible only in extremely rare cases. Yet for the most part the state simply does not have the money to carry out the necessary development tasks.

A New Exodus from the Country

Approximately 70 such zones were established in South Vietnam after the war, several hundred thousand people have settled there, yet many have gone back to the cities in order not to starve. Even the number of young people in the "volunteer work gangs" has decreased from 20,000 in 1978 to 10,000. The new economic zones do not represent a pat solution for the employment problem.

Some 9 years after the war there is an entire generation of children living in the south of Vietnam who can no longer remember any Americans. Pictures of Ho Chi Minh hang in the schools and public buildings. The children wear the red neckerchiefs of the Young Pioneers. Nonetheless, one is constantly reminded of the fact that thus far national reconciliation after the war has not taken place: On the one hand there are the people from the North who have transplanted parts of their model on South Vietnam; these include the police, the army, the party people, the mass media and the economic administration. One-third of all state officials were brought from North Vietnam after the war, and even today practically all leadership positions are filled by people from Hanoi. On the other side there are the people who have come to terms with the government, but nothing more. To the extent they are able, they continue to lead their normal lives; South Vietnam has certainly become more Vietnamese, yet the North and the South, even in reunified Vietnam, remain very alienated.

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